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School vouchers introduced recently in some Italian regions have lowered the cost of
private schools. On the one hand, we provide evidence that Italian private schools may
be selected for different reasons other than quality considerations. On the other hand,
by exploiting individual data on voucher applicants, we present evidence that the per-
centage of voucher applicants is higher, the higher the average quality of private
schools. We explain this with the fact that better quality schools provide better serv-
ices to students, including information and consulting on vouchers. We show that en-
rolment in private schools responds sluggishly to changes in tuition induced by vouch-
ers. Under stringent assumptions, we estimate the slopes of supply and demand of pri-
vate education in the largest Italian region, Lombardy, during the first two years since
implementation of a voucher scheme, and provide a quantitative assessment of the
long – term impact of vouchers on tuition fees and enrolment in private schools. 
J.E.L. 
Keywords: 
1. INTRODUCTION.
The acknowledged importance of human capital for productivity,
growth and innovation has brought school reform to the forefront of aca-
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demic and policy discussion. In the current debate, the key word for school
reform is choice. By increasing choice, policy makers and advisors believe
that competition among schools can be enhanced, with favourable conse-
quences on the accumulation of human capital. 
Choice implies more competition, but does not necessarily require that
private schools play a key role in the education process. Open enrolment
policies, and public funding closely tied to the number of pupils, as in the
UK or in New Zealand, can also encourage a more efficient use of scarce re-
sources within the public school system (see Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996). The
risk of school stratification is often mentioned as a by-product of this type
of reform (Fiske and Ladd 2000).
Since Milton Freedman’s seminal work on school choice, school vouch-
ers have been widely debated – mainly outside of Italy – as a tool to increase
efficiency and equality in educational attainment. Many Italian regions now
have vouchers. Do they make a difference? What effect do they have on
school choice and efficiency? Answering these questions is hard, especially
since the introduction of vouchers in Italy is very recent: even if it works, it
takes time for school choice to change things in a significant manner. 
This paper is a first look at vouchers as they have been implemented in
Italy. Given the relatively poor quality of the data at hand, we keep a de-
scriptive and rather informal style. We start by examining the quality of pri-
vate schools in Italy, and argue that perhaps they are rather different from
US private schools (Section 2). We then briefly review the economic litera-
ture on vouchers (Section 3). We move on to illustrate how vouchers are sup-
posed to operate in Italy and to discuss some preliminary descriptive evi-
dence based on administrative data for Lombardy, the largest and richest
Italian region (Section 4). We turn to a more substantive discussion in Sec-
tion 5, where we estimate a demand and supply model and try to gauge the
effects of the voucher system on tuition fees and private school enrolment. 
We find that the introduction of vouchers in Lombardy should increase
both tuition fees – by close to 5 percent – and enrolment in private schools
– by about 10 percent. The foreseen change in enrolment will take time to
materialize, however, because both demand and supply respond rather slug-
gishly to price changes. Conclusions follow.
2. ARE ITALIAN PRIVATE SCHOOLS ON AVERAGE OF BETTER QUALITY THAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS?
On the other side of the Atlantic, the academic discussion on school
choice often takes it for granted that the average quality of private K-12
schools is higher than the quality of public schools – see for instance Epple
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and Romano [1998]. The empirical evidence on the issue is, however, far
from overwhelming. Neal [2002] reviews the US empirical evidence and con-
cludes that Catholic private schools raise educational attainment compared
to public schools significantly for racial minorities in urban areas, but mod-
estly for urban whites. He also shows that there is no evidence that subur-
ban whites that attend the most expensive public schools actually achieve
more than public school students. Figlio and Stone, [1997], on the other
hand, show that religious private schools in the US provide lower quality,
measured by performance test scores, in mathematics and science than pub-
lic schools. Sharply in contrast, nonreligious private schools are found to of-
fer higher quality in these fields than public schools. 
Ladd [2002] reviews non-US evidence and shows that in Chile Catholic
schools generate higher achievement in Spanish and math than public
schools but that private secular schools are marginally less productive than
public schools. Vandenberghe and Robin [2004] use the PISA dataset for an
heterogeneous group of countries to examine the effect of private versus pub-
lic education on pupils’ achievement and show that private education does
not generate systematic benefits. 
What is the evidence for Italy? Bertola and Checchi [2004] are perhaps the
first to show that Italian private schools provide on average lower quality than
public schools. They argue that in Italy private schools “..appear to play a re-
medial role. On average, they increase the performance of students from rich
families, but their value added seems to be the recovery of less brilliant stu-
dents rather than across-the-board high quality education” (p.97). The essen-
tial argument by Bertola and Checchi is that private schools are good at cater-
ing to the rich and lazy, possibly offering leisure and a degree for a price. Cap-
pellari [2004] confirms their results studying the 1995 high school graduates
from the Italian survey on High School and Beyond; he shows that the prob-
ability of graduating from a private school rises with the availability of re-
sources in the family of origin but decreases with school performance prior to
high school. Brunello and Rocco [2004] confirm this result using data on the
1998 cohort of the same survey and find that enrolment in a public upper sec-
ondary school in Italy is higher – ceteris paribus – for students with better
marks in junior high school. They also show that public school graduates are
more likely to enrol in college than private school students. 
Interesting information on the characteristics of students in Italian pri-
vate schools can be obtained from the PISA 2000 survey, a cross-country in-
vestigation on 15-year-old students.2 Table 1 presents the results of a probit
2 The Pisa (Programme for International Student Assessment) is a survey coordinated
by OECD and conducted by Canada Statistics (www.pisa.org). The first wave has been run 
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 69
70 GIORGIO BRUNELLO - DANIELE CHECCHI
model where the dependent variable is the probability of enrolment in a pri-
vate school and the explanatory variables include family background, type
of school attended, region where the school is located, and general house-
hold attitude toward education. 
in 2000 in 35 countries, while a second wave was run in 2003. The aim of the programme
is the assessment of student skills (literacy, numeracy and scientific knowledge) in a com-
parable way across countries. The Italian sample is composed by 4984 students, aged 15,
from 172 schools (8 of which are lower secondary schools, and are excluded from the re-
gression reported in the text. Missing information reduces the sample even further.
TABLE 1 – Probability of enrolment in private schools – upper secondary
schools. PISA 2000. Weighed maximum likelihood probit; marginal effects. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
female -0.010 0.01
age 0.000 0.00
only child 0.007 0.01
father primary school 0.050*** 0.02
father lower secondary 0.069*** 0.02
father vocational 0.069** 0.05
father upper secondary 0.056*** 0.02
father university degree 0.033*** 0.01
mother primary school -0.020 0.01
mother lower secondary -0.006 0.02
mother vocational -0.007 0.02
mother upper secondary 0.003 0.02
mother university degree 0.000 0.02
socio-economic index family 0.000* 0.00
student aspirations 0.000 0.00
family wealth 0.025*** 0.00
family educational support 0.001 0.00
Home educational resources -0.006 0.00
parents interested in school -0.003*** 0.00
student cultural activity -0.005* 0.00
family possession of books 0.003 0.00
North-East -0.042*** 0.00
Centre -0.045*** 0.00
South east -0.066*** 0.01
technical school 0.037*** 0.02
general school 0.063*** 0.01
N.obs 3868
Pseudo R2 0.25
Note: standard error clustered by macro-regions; one, two and three stars for statistical significance at
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence respectively.
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It turns out that students enrolled in Italian private schools are more
likely to be the offspring of educated fathers, to have higher aspirations – in
terms of the socio-economic index associated to the job they hope to get
when out of school – and to live in wealthier households. They tend also to
be enrolled in general secondary schools (at a lesser extent in technical
schools), are less involved in cultural activities, and their parents are less in-
terested in their school activity.3
Additional evidence on this important issue can be gleaned from the
1998 wave of the Multiscopo (Multipurpose) Survey conducted by the Na-
tional Statistics Institute on a sample of 20153 Italian households. The sur-
vey is useful for our purposes because it includes a section on the schooling
of individuals younger than 18. We exploit a question in the survey asking
the reasons why the interviewed household has enrolled one or more chil-
dren in a private school. The available options include school quality (qual-
ity of teachers, quality of services provided), religious and ideological rea-
sons, vicinity, availability of seats and economic reasons – relative to the cost
of private education.
Table 2 shows the results of a probit regression that associates the prob-
ability of enrolment in private schools to some of these reasons and addi-
tional covariates. We find that households who have not considered the
choice between private and public schools are more likely to enrol their chil-
dren in public schools. More than cultural and ideological reasons, it is the
expectation of better services and higher teacher quality that drives the
choice of private schools. Naturally, economic reasons – given the cost of en-
rolling in private schools – are important for the selection of public schools. 
The expectation that private schools are of better quality than public
schools does not appear to be well grounded, however. There are (at least)
four pieces of evidence that makes us seriously doubt that private schools
are on average of better quality than public schools. First, many Italian stu-
dents participate in remedial education, either at school or privately, as they
try to catch up with the rest of the class. The probability of participating in
this type of education is higher among private school students, even after
conditioning for family background. Table 3 shows that the estimated coef-
ficient of the private school dummy is positive and statistically significant at
the 5 percent level of confidence.
3 Checchi and Jappelli 2003 conduct a similar exercise on a different sample, drawn
from the 1993 Bank of Italy Household Survey (SHIW). They find that family disposable
income and parental education are significant predictors of secondary school enrolment.
An objective measure of quality, based on the average student-teacher ratio at the provin-
cial level, seems also to affect the choice of the type of school.
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Second, students in private schools have less homework to do. Not
shown here, an ordered probit estimate of the quantity of homework as a
function of a number of controls and of the type of school, shows that home-
work is significantly lower in private schools. Unless work at school and at
home are perfect substitutes, so that students in private schools work less at
home because they work harder at school, these results suggest that less ef-
fort is required from students in private schools. 
TABLE 2 – Probit model: enrolment in a private school. 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ST.ERR. VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ST.ERR.
Gender 0.030 0.050 Number rooms / house -0.023 0.016
Rented house -0.080 0.067
Did not think -0.893*** 0.076
about reasons
Quality of teachers 0.555*** 0.073 Number siblings -0.082** 0.036
Services provided 0.585*** 0.089 Foreigner -0.139 0.344
Cultural reasons 0.155 0.102
Economic Reasons -0.908*** 0.233 Father manager 0.017 0.104
Father professional 0.329*** 0.079
Father’s education 0.015** 0.007 Father self-employed 0.193*** 0.066
Mother’s education 0.009 0.007 Mother manager 0.216 0.164
Mother professional 0.059 0.156
Computer 0.036 0.057 Mother self-employed 0.119 0.092
Pseudo R2 0.308 N.obs 8093
Source: ISTAT, Indagine Multiscopo 1998. Robust standard errors. The regression includes type of
school, regional and class dummies. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent level of confidence
TABLE 3 – Probit model: probability of enrolment in remedial programs. 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ST.ERR. VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ST.ERR.
Gender 0.099** 0.042 Mother self-employed -0.051 0.078
Private school 0.220** 0.101 Attitude to school -0.229*** 0.018
Father’s education 0.005 0.005 Absence 0.113*** 0.020
Mother’s education 0.001 0.005 Rented house 0.075 0.053
Number siblings -0.045* 0.023 Computer -0.068* 0.044
Foreigner 0.130 0.307 Number rooms house 0.016 0.011
Father manager -0.159* 0.087
Father professional -0.190** 0.076
Father self-employed -0.093* 0.054
Mother manager -0.061 0.165
Mother professional -0.153 0.154
Pseudo R2 0.140 N.obs 6783
Source: See Table 2.
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Third, when we compare the age distribution of students according to
school types (see Table 4), we find evidence that private schools attract two
different type of students: in the initial years of primary school they gather
early starters, who are typically the offspring of educated parents who wish
to shorten the educational career of their kids. Later on, some of these ear-
ly starters shift to public schools (otherwise it would be impossible to ob-
serve an increase in younger than regular students there), while a flow in the
opposite direction – from public to private - occurs involving students who
have been held back by repetitions (bocciatura). The fact that the percent-
age of older students steadily increases in private schools during upper sec-
ondary school indicates that these schools attract students in trouble with
their educational career.
Last but not least, and going back to the PISA sample, Table 5 presents
the results of the regression of literacy scores on a set of controls and on the
TABLE 4 – Age distribution of students, by class and school types – 
Italy – 2001-2. 
Public school Private school
School level younger regular older younger regular older
Primary school
I 0,00% 98,31% 1,69% 3,64% 94,68% 1,68%
II 2,08% 95,76% 2,16% 15,86% 82,08% 2,06%
III 2,38% 95,03% 2,59% 16,48% 81,20% 2,32%
IV 2,48% 94,61% 2,91% 16,13% 81,47% 2,40%
V 2,82% 93,63% 3,55% 16,73% 80,76% 2,51%
Total 1,98% 95,42% 2,60% 14,09% 83,69% 2,22%
Junior high school
I 3,65% 88,36% 7,99% 8,54% 87,10% 4,36%
II 3,79% 85,71% 10,50% 8,43% 85,66% 5,91%
III 3,91% 84,11% 11,98% 8,39% 83,76% 7,85%
Total 3,78% 86,08% 10,14% 8,45% 85,53% 6,02%
Upper secondary school
I 3,67% 74,43% 21,90% 7,40% 67,63% 24,97%
II 4,07% 72,60% 23,33% 8,08% 65,86% 26,06%
III 4,24% 68,70% 27,06% 7,44% 57,08% 35,48%
IV 4,77% 67,60% 27,63% 7,55% 55,42% 37,03%
V 5,25% 68,99% 25,76% 6,21% 41,27% 52,52%
Total 4,32% 70,79% 24,89% 7,19% 55,15% 37,66%
Overall 3.25% 84.59% 12.16% 10.33% 72.45% 17.22%
Source: Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, Scuola non statale: indagine conosciti-
va – a.s. 2001/02, Rome 2003, table 35Source: See Table 2.
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type of school. It turns out that the attained score is 22-25 points higher for
students of public schools, close to 5 percent of the mean standardized score
of 500 (with a standard deviation of 100). An open question is whether this
negative effect is due to poor teaching and/or poor services or to the fact that
these schools cater to the less talented offspring of wealthy households. To
sort these effects out would require the use of valid instruments for partici-
TABLE 5 – Literacy scores based on average school characteristics – PISA
2000 - Upper secondary schools – weighed ordinary least square (ols) and
instrumental variables (iv). 
SCHOOL AVERAGES STUDENTS (OLS) STUDENTS (IV)
COEFF SE COEFF SE COEFF SE
general school 94.87*** 13.14 97.45*** 4.62 121.39*** 29.16
technical school 36.11*** 9.84 36.09*** 4.21 59.14*** 13.43
parental education -5.93 4.80 -0.33 0.45 0.52 0.43
(years - school average)
parental socio-economic 1.67 1.07 0.12 0.12 0.34*** 0.10
status (school avrg)
school size 0.02* 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 -0.05** 0.02
(number of students)
student/teacher ratio 2.50* 1.38 2.22*** 0.83 3.30 5.25
(school average)
lack of teachers 4.54 3.60 4.25*** 1.66 17.16*** 5.68
poor quality of -5.82* 3.22 -5.58*** 1.53 -4.43 4.91
educational resources
poor quality of -0.08 3.48 -1.06 1.41 -10.91** 5.01
the school buildings
teacher behaviour -0.91 3.61 -0.74 1.94 -11.91** 5.84
student behaviour 9.58** 4.66 9.73*** 1.97 -1.56 9.59
teacher moral -5.23 3.25 -6.08*** 2.15 8.52 9.47
private school -25.00*** 9.70 -22.04*** 6.71 -311.6*** 116.51
city size -6.24*** 2.14 -5.97*** 1.35 1.64 6.11
North-West Italy 78.95*** 10.43 74.75*** 4.91 113.20*** 19.39
North-East Italy 67.64*** 13.21 63.38*** 5.16 75.06*** 16.91
Central Italy 53.06*** 13.63 43.55*** 4.81 38.79*** 15.44
South-East Italy 15.20 10.78 11.39*** 4.28 12.26 10.66
Constant 369.99*** 29.38 380.50*** 9.83 370.40*** 35.99
N.obs 150 4502 4457
R2 0.80 0.36 0.02
Hansen J-statistics 50.56 (0.00)
Note: Standard errors for school estimates are heteroschedastically consistent – standard errors for in-
dividual estimates are robust and cluster adjusted. One, two and three stars for statistical significance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. Instruments for private school in column 5: family wealth,
family educational support, home educational resources, parents interested in school, student cultural
activity, family possession of books.va – a.s. 2001/02, Rome 2003, table 35Source: See Table 2.
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pation in private schools, or panel data that remove the fixed individual ef-
fect. Since the second option is not available in this dataset, we have in-
strumented the choice of private school with variables measuring household
wealth and preference for cultural activities. Conditional on parental edu-
cation and socio-economic status, which we include in the regression, these
variables are likely to capture both financial resources and attitudes toward
schooling. As reported in the last two columns of the table, going to a pri-
vate school does reduce literacy scores by a substantial – and statistically sig-
nificant – amount.
3. SCHOOL CHOICE AND VOUCHERS.
School choice programs have been active in the US since the late 1980s
as policy responses to the perceived poor quality of American public schools
in the K12 system. These programs include charter schools and vouchers. In
the UK, school choice was started by the Education Reform Act of 1988,
which introduced a quasi-market for education. In the US, charter schools
and vouchers involve private schools. In the UK, the quasi-market operates
mainly within a public school system. 
The key features of the UK quasi-market are: open enrolment with
parental choice; overlapping catch areas around schools; local management
and funding of schools; funding on the basis of the number of pupils (see
Burgess et al, 2004, for more details). Vouchers in the US are coupons used
by the household to pay tuition fees in the school of choice, which could be
public or private. The school gets revenue equal to the coupon upon enrol-
ment, and the voucher is funded by public money. The amount of the vouch-
er can be identical across all students or vary with individual and school
characteristics. The typical voucher in the US is worth between 14 and 29
percent of the per-pupil expenditure in the local public schools (Minter Hox-
by, 2003). School voucher programs exist in the US only on a small scale,
with the main programs being funded in Milwaukee, Cleveland and Florida.
Large-scale programs are available in other countries, including Chile,
Colombia and New Zealand. 
Supporters of school vouchers expect the following effects from the in-
troduction of a program: first, students will shift from public to private
schools. Provided that private schools are more productive than public
schools and deliver better schooling achievement, this shift should increase
the overall productivity of the system. Second, students of better academic
quality are more likely to shift, because private schools are keen to attract
pupils that improve their average peer quality. Therefore, vouchers are like-
ly to increase stratification, with uncertain effects on efficiency. These effects
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depend on whether the average gains of pupils in private schools, who en-
joy better peers, are superior to the average losses of pupils in public schools,
who are stuck with worse peers. Third, competition for students should in-
crease. Such competition will improve public schools in order to avoid los-
ing pupils and the associated resources. Opponents argue that an addition-
al effect is regressive redistribution: unless vouchers are targeted to poor
households, the large majority of recipients are the wealthy, who use private
schools more than the average household.
The debate on the existence and the size of these effects is on, and no
clear consensus has yet emerged, partly because the empirical evidence on
the impact of existing programs is at best mixed and unconvincing. One im-
portant issue is whether private schools are more productive than public
schools. The evidence in Section 2 raises doubts that Italian private schools
are on average more productive than public schools. In this environment, it
is questionable whether the introduction of publicly funded vouchers can in-
crease overall productive efficiency. If vouchers are offered to all students en-
rolled in private schools, there will be productivity gains only for those stu-
dents who move from a low quality public institution to a high quality pri-
vate institution. 
The second related issue is whether vouchers increase efficiency by rais-
ing stratification by ability, as private schools try to attract high ability stu-
dents to increase the average quality of the peer group. The question here
boils down to whether peer effects are linear or not. If they are linear, the
gains in achievement to a student moving to a private school with better
peers is exactly compensated by the loss in achievement of other students,
either in the school left behind or in the destination school. Only if peer ef-
fects are asymmetric, and the gains are higher than the losses, is the reallo-
cation induced by vouchers efficiency-enhancing. The evidence on the pres-
ence of asymmetries, however, seems to be limited (Ladd, 2002).
The last issue is whether vouchers increase competition. Minter Hoxby
[2004] examines in detail the Milwaukee voucher experiment and concludes
that “..overall, the improvements in the Milwaukee public schools, following
the 1998 voucher reforms, ..[have been] very impressive..” (p.34). Ladd re-
views US and non US evidence and conclude on a more pessimistic note. She
argues that “..the notion that the unproductive schools will go out of busi-
ness and that new and more effective public schools will replace them is far
easier imagined than done..” (p.15). She also questions Hoxby’s results and
claims that they are overstated.
Overall, the empirical international evidence on the effects of vouchers
on the education market is mixed at best. Private schools around the world
are heterogeneous, and the evidence that they are more productive than pri-
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vate schools is not overwhelming, especially outside the US. There is limit-
ed empirical evidence that peer effects are non-linear and affect relatively
more the academic performance of more talented students. Finally, the ef-
fects of vouchers on school competition are controversial. The bottom line
is that more empirical evidence is needed before a proper evaluation of the
effects of vouchers. 
4. VOUCHERS IN ITALY.
Italy has witnessed a recent wave of expansion in the funds offered to
households in support of the educational choices made on behalf of their
children. The previous left-wing national government allocated funds to re-
gions in order to cover transportation costs, meals expenditures, and to sub-
sidize private certified schools undertaking specific educational projects (Na-
tional Law n.62/2000), and some regions topped up these funds with local
funds, using the revenue from general taxation. More recently, the current
right-wing government has introduced a national fund – with no targeting –
aimed at partially subsidizing enrolment in private institutions (National
Law n.289/2002). The enacted law has started a heated debate in the coun-
try, because the Constitutional Law explicitly prohibits public funding of pri-
vate education4. When Lombardy, a region with a right-wing local govern-
ment, first subsidized tuition paid to private institutions, it was sued in the
Central Court (Corte Costituzionale) by the left-wing national government of
the time. The trial never reached a decision, however, because the next right-
wing government withdrew from the trial. The rationale behind subsidizing
private school tuition is that this improves the freedom of choice of Italian
households. The size of the subsidies, however, are rather limited compared
to other countries (the coverage rate typically ranging from 25% to 50%), are
not related to merit and are only partially related to household income. Let
us review how the system works in more details.
4.1. The regional legislation in Italy.
Between 2001 and 2003, 9 Italian regions out of 20 introduced a school
voucher targeted at reducing educational expenditures. Only 8 regions, how-
ever, have earmarked funds to implement the scheme. Table 6 gathers the
4 The Constitutional Law states explicitly (art.33) that “…institutions and private citi-
zens have the right to create schools and educational institutes, without any support (our
Italics) from the public budget (Enti e privati hanno il diritto di istituire scuole ed istituti di
educazione, senza oneri per lo Stato)”
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available information in a comparative way5. If we exclude Tuscany and
Emilia (governed by left-wing coalitions), all the other regions have designed
the voucher as an ex-post reimbursement of tuition expenditure. The per-
centage of reimbursement varies between 80% (Friuli, for household income
below 26.000 €) and 25% (Lombardy and Sicily). In 5 regions there is a cap
to the subsidy, ranging from 1875 € (upper secondary school in Piedmont
for a poor household) to 210 € (primary school in Veneto for a middle in-
come household). The payment of the voucher in all regions but Emilia and
Tuscany is conditional on family income – the voucher being paid only for
incomes below a given threshold – but is independent of school perform-
ance. On the contrary, in these other two regions student performance mat-
ters: in Tuscany for instance the voucher is designed as a scholarship for the
initial two years of upper secondary school, conditional on attaining pro-
motion. Similarly in Emilia, where the awarded student needs to have an av-
erage marks of 7 out of 10.
Therefore we observe two alternative approaches to vouchers in Italy:
on the one side, there is a partial reimbursement system aimed at alleviat-
ing the tuition costs born by private school users. In this system an income
ceiling is introduced to mitigate its regressive nature, due to the fact that the
average student enrolled in a private school comes from a well-off house-
hold6. On the other side, there is a system based on a fixed payment, condi-
tional on school performance and family income, with a much lower income
threshold (approximately 10.000 € in Emilia and 18.000 € in Tuscany). 
From a theoretical point of view, when the educational investment of
households is conditional on income and student ability, and these resources
are complements in human capital formation, it can be shown that the op-
timal educational policy is not redistributive (De Fraja 2002).7 In this frame-
work, properly designed voucher schemes can address equity issues: by con-
ditioning on both student observable ability – inferred from performance –
and on household income/wealth, these schemes can reduce the liquidity
constraints of bright students, thereby increasing equality of opportunity in
the society as a whole. In the current Italian experience, neither of the ap-
5 A brief review of this legislation is also contained in Beltrametti, 2004, p.113 ss. 
6 The ceiling in most cases is so high to include as eligible the majority of households.
Lombardy and Veneto are two good examples of this system, as they impose a ceiling of ap-
proximately 40000 € per family member, which is far above the gross median labour income
for year 2000, equal to 28.000 € according to the Bank of Italy Household Survey.
7 “Those who get the most out of the education system are the bright children of suf-
ficiently well-off parents…Because of these features, the optimal education policies oper-
ates in a direction opposite to a redistributive policy: brighter children are subsidised by
the taxpayer and by the average children” (DeFraja 2002, p.458).
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 78
SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE 79
8
F
or
 e
xa
m
p
le
 L
om
b
ar
d
y 
re
im
b
u
rs
es
 u
p
 t
o 
30
%
 o
f 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s,
 w
it
h
 a
 c
ap
 o
f 
51
6
€
, 
77
5
€
an
d
 1
03
3
€
fo
r 
st
u
d
en
ts
 a
tt
en
d
in
g 
p
ri
-
m
ar
y,
 l
ow
er
 s
ec
on
d
ar
y 
an
d
 u
p
p
er
 s
ec
on
d
ar
y 
sc
h
oo
l 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
; 
th
er
e 
is
 a
ls
o 
a 
m
in
im
u
m
 t
h
re
sh
ol
d
 o
f 
51
€
. 
T
h
e 
fa
m
il
y 
in
co
m
e 
ce
il
in
g 
is
14
.6
95
€
in
 L
om
b
ar
d
y,
 1
7.
72
1
€
in
 T
u
sc
an
y 
an
d
 o
n
ly
 1
0.
63
2
€
in
 P
u
gl
ia
.
9
IS
E
E
 (
In
d
ic
e 
d
el
la
 S
it
u
az
io
n
e 
E
co
n
om
ic
a 
E
qu
iv
al
en
te
) 
is
 t
h
e 
eq
u
iv
al
is
ed
 i
n
d
ex
 o
f 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 s
it
u
at
io
n
. I
t 
is
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ec
o-
n
om
ic
 p
os
si
b
il
it
y 
of
 a
 f
am
il
y 
m
em
b
er
, a
n
d
 i
s 
ob
ta
in
ed
 b
y 
su
m
m
in
g 
la
b
ou
r 
in
co
m
es
, t
h
eo
re
ti
ca
l i
n
co
m
es
 f
ro
m
 p
ro
p
er
ti
es
 a
n
d
 f
ix
ed
 in
co
m
es
fr
om
 f
in
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s,
 m
in
u
s 
re
n
ts
 a
n
d
 c
ap
it
al
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
; 
th
e 
re
su
lt
 i
s 
th
en
 n
or
m
al
is
ed
 a
cc
or
d
in
g 
to
 a
n
 e
qu
iv
al
en
ce
 s
ca
le
.
10
T
h
e 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 l
aw
 f
or
 2
00
3 
se
t 
a 
m
ax
im
u
m
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 a
t 
n
at
io
n
al
 l
ev
el
 e
qu
al
 t
o 
30
 m
il
li
on
s 
of
 e
u
ro
s.
 T
h
e 
to
ta
l 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ot
en
-
ti
al
 a
p
p
li
ca
n
ts
 is
 u
n
kn
ow
n
, b
u
t 
co
n
si
d
er
in
g 
h
al
f 
of
 t
h
e 
en
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 a
ll
 p
ri
va
te
 s
ch
oo
ls
 (
co
m
p
ri
si
n
g 
b
ot
h
 c
er
ti
fi
ed
 a
n
d
 n
ot
 c
er
ti
fi
ed
 s
ch
oo
ls
),
w
e 
ob
ta
in
 a
n
 e
st
im
at
e 
of
 1
37
.5
80
 s
tu
d
en
ts
, 
w
h
ic
h
 e
n
ta
il
s 
an
 a
ve
ra
ge
 b
on
u
s 
of
 2
18
€
. 
T
h
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
 p
er
io
d
 s
p
an
s 
ov
er
 t
h
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
(2
00
3,
20
04
 a
n
d
 2
00
5)
.
R
E
G
IO
N
A
ll
 r
eg
io
n
s
A
ll
 r
eg
io
n
s
L
A
W
N
at
io
n
al
 L
aw
62
/2
00
0
ar
t.
2 
of
N
at
io
n
al
F
in
an
ci
al
L
aw
 2
89
/2
00
2
P
R
IV
A
T
E
/
P
U
B
L
IC
st
at
e 
an
d
ce
rt
if
ie
d
p
ri
va
te
(p
ar
it
ar
ia
)
on
ly
 c
er
ti
fi
ed
p
ri
va
te
(p
ar
it
ar
ia
)
S
C
H
O
O
L
O
R
D
E
R
p
ri
m
ar
y,
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
A
D
M
IS
S
IB
L
E
E
X
P
E
N
D
IT
U
R
E
S
tr
an
sp
or
ts
,
m
ea
ls
 a
n
d
te
xt
b
oo
ks
tu
it
io
n
A
M
O
U
N
T
O
F
T
H
E
P
U
B
L
IC
S
U
B
S
ID
Y
d
ec
id
ed
 b
y
ea
ch
 r
eg
io
n
8
15
0-
20
0
€
,
d
ep
en
d
in
g 
on
th
e 
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
10
C
O
N
D
IT
IO
N
A
L
O
N
IN
C
O
M
E
fa
m
il
y
in
co
m
e
(I
S
E
E
)9
th
re
sh
ol
d
 o
f
21
69
1
€
ab
se
n
t
A
P
P
L
IC
A
N
T
S
/E
X
P
E
N
D
IT
U
R
E
N
O
T
E
S
ca
n
 b
e
cu
m
u
la
te
d
w
it
h
 r
eg
io
n
al
su
b
si
d
ie
s
ca
n
 b
e
cu
m
u
la
te
d
w
it
h
 r
eg
io
n
al
su
b
si
d
ie
s
T
A
B
L
E
6 
– 
S
ch
oo
l 
su
pp
or
t 
sc
h
em
es
 i
n
 n
at
io
n
al
 a
n
d 
re
gi
on
al
 l
eg
is
la
ti
on
 –
 I
ta
ly
 -
 2
00
4.
 
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 79
80 GIORGIO BRUNELLO - DANIELE CHECCHI
P
ie
d
m
on
t
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
10
/2
00
3
st
at
e 
an
d
ce
rt
if
ie
d
p
ri
va
te
(p
ar
it
ar
ia
)
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
tu
it
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
 7
5%
an
d
 5
0%
 
of
 t
h
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
,
w
it
h
 a
 c
ap
re
la
te
d
 t
o 
th
e
sc
h
oo
l 
le
ve
l
(1
12
5-
75
0
€
fo
r 
p
ri
m
ar
y,
16
50
-1
10
0
€
fo
r 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
an
d
 1
87
5-
12
50
 f
or
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y)
an
d
 f
am
il
y
in
co
m
e
75
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
fo
r 
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
(I
S
E
E
) 
b
el
ow
7.
60
0
€
,
d
ec
li
n
in
g 
to
50
%
 f
or
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
es
b
et
w
ee
n
20
00
0
€
an
d
30
40
0
€
(w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
th
e
m
ax
im
u
m
th
re
sh
ol
d
).
C
h
il
d
re
n
ac
co
u
n
te
d
 f
or
u
si
n
g 
th
e
IS
E
E
eq
u
iv
al
en
ce
sc
al
e 
16
.6
12
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
s
fo
r 
20
03
-4
13
.4
91
 f
ou
n
d
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
18
.0
00
.0
00
€
al
lo
ca
te
d
 
th
e 
su
b
si
d
y 
is
n
ot
 p
ai
d
w
h
en
ev
er
 t
h
e
tu
it
io
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
d
oe
s 
n
ot
ex
ce
ed
s 
th
e
2%
 o
f
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
T
A
B
L
E
6 
– 
co
n
ti
n
u
e
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 80
SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE 81
L
ig
u
ri
a
L
om
b
ar
d
y
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
14
/2
00
2
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
1/
20
00
 -
D
.C
.R
.V
II
/3
90
20
/1
2/
20
01
 -
D
.G
.R
.1
62
56
6/
2/
20
04
st
at
e 
an
d
p
ri
va
te
(i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
tl
y 
on
 b
ei
n
g
ce
rt
if
ie
d
)
st
at
e 
an
d
ce
rt
if
ie
d
p
ri
va
te
(p
ar
it
ar
ia
)
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
u
it
io
n
tu
it
io
n
 a
n
d
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
on
fo
r 
cu
rr
ic
u
la
r
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
50
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
(7
5%
 f
or
h
an
d
ic
ap
p
ed
ch
il
d
) 
w
it
h
 a
m
in
im
u
m
 o
f
50
0
€
m
in
im
u
m
p
ai
d
 i
n
 2
00
3-
4
is
 2
50
€
an
d
m
ax
im
u
m
 i
s
75
0
€
fr
om
 5
2
€
to
10
50
€
fa
m
il
y
in
co
m
e
(I
R
P
E
F
)1
1
th
re
sh
ol
d
 o
f
40
.0
00
€
(i
t 
is
ra
is
ed
 b
y
10
.0
00
€
p
er
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
 i
n
ex
ce
ss
 o
ve
r
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
on
e)
50
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
fo
r 
fa
m
il
y
in
co
m
e
(I
R
P
E
F
) 
p
er
ca
p
it
a 
le
ss
th
an
 8
.3
48
€
;
25
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
fo
r 
fa
m
il
y 
p
er
ca
p
it
a
in
co
m
e 
le
ss
th
an
 3
09
87
€
77
4.
68
5
€
al
lo
ca
te
d
 i
n
20
03
-4
In
 2
00
0-
1 
55
.0
40
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
 
49
.9
35
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
30
.7
40
.7
42
€
sp
en
t
In
 2
00
1-
2 
51
.1
31
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
 
48
.4
89
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
36
.4
17
.5
06
€
sp
en
t
In
 2
00
2-
3 
51
.2
00
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
 
48
.3
00
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
37
.0
24
.7
50
€
sp
en
t
th
e 
su
b
si
d
y 
is
n
ot
 p
ai
d
w
h
en
ev
er
 i
t 
is
le
ss
 t
h
an
20
8
€
11
IR
P
E
F
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
gr
os
s 
in
co
m
e 
d
ec
la
re
d
 f
or
 f
is
ca
l 
p
u
rp
os
es
.
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 81
82 GIORGIO BRUNELLO - DANIELE CHECCHI
V
en
et
o
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
1/
20
01
st
at
e 
an
d
ce
rt
if
ie
d
p
ri
va
te
(p
ar
it
ar
ia
)
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
tu
it
io
n
sp
ec
ia
l
su
p
p
or
t 
fo
r
h
an
d
ic
ap
p
ed
ch
il
d
re
n
60
0/
90
0/
13
00
(p
ri
m
./
lo
w
.s
ec
./
u
p
.s
ec
.)
 f
or
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
es
b
el
ow
17
.0
00
€
;
26
0/
52
0/
77
0
fo
r 
in
co
m
es
b
et
w
ee
n
17
.0
00
 a
n
d
30
.0
00
€
;
21
0/
36
0/
52
0
fo
r 
in
co
m
es
b
et
w
ee
n
30
.0
00
 a
n
d
40
.0
00
€
.
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
(I
S
E
E
) 
b
el
ow
40
.0
00
€
In
 2
00
0-
1
15
.3
82
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
th
e 
su
b
si
d
y 
is
n
ot
 p
ai
d
w
h
en
ev
er
 t
h
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
is
 l
es
s 
th
an
20
0
€
F
ri
u
li
 V
en
ez
ia
G
iu
li
a
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
14
/1
99
1
on
ly
 p
ri
va
te
(i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
tl
y 
on
 b
ei
n
g
ce
rt
if
ie
d
)
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
tu
it
io
n
m
in
im
u
m
p
ai
d
 i
n
 2
00
1-
2
is
 6
07
€
an
d
m
ax
im
u
m
 i
s
20
82
€
80
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
fo
r 
fa
m
il
y
in
co
m
e
(I
R
P
E
F
)
b
el
ow
26
.0
00
€
,
d
ec
li
n
in
g 
to
50
%
 f
or
in
co
m
es
b
et
w
ee
n
39
00
0
€
an
d
53
80
0
€
(w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
th
e
m
ax
im
u
m
th
re
sh
ol
d
 –
 i
t
ca
n
 b
e 
ra
is
ed
b
y 
25
88
€
p
er
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ch
il
d
)
3.
00
0.
00
0
€
al
lo
ca
te
d
 i
n
20
01
-2
T
A
B
L
E
6 
– 
co
n
ti
n
u
e
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 82
SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE 83
E
m
il
ia
R
om
ag
n
a
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
26
/2
00
1
st
at
e 
an
d
p
ri
va
te
(i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
tl
y 
on
 b
ei
n
g
ce
rt
if
ie
d
)
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
12
5
€
fo
r
p
ri
m
ar
y
25
0
€
fo
r
lo
w
.s
ec
.
10
00
 f
or
u
p
.s
ec
. 
U
p
.s
ec
.
su
b
si
d
y 
is
 a
ls
o
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
on
 a
n
 a
ve
ra
ge
m
ar
k 
ab
ov
e
se
ve
n
.
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
(I
S
E
E
)
th
re
sh
ol
d
 o
f
10
.6
32
€
fo
r
p
ri
m
ar
y 
an
d
se
co
n
d
ar
y.
 
F
or
 u
p
.s
ec
.
d
ec
li
n
es
 w
it
h
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e,
 w
it
h
a 
ce
il
in
g 
of
21
.2
65
€
eq
u
iv
al
is
ed
in
co
m
e 
p
er
m
em
b
er
 o
f
th
e 
fa
m
il
y
39
.9
80
 i
n
20
02
-3
 f
or
 a
to
ta
l 
of
16
.6
16
.7
50
€
fo
r 
p
ri
m
ar
y
an
d
lo
w
.s
ec
on
d
ar
y 
sc
h
oo
l
n
at
io
n
al
fu
n
d
s 
fr
om
l.6
2/
20
00
Tu
sc
an
y
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
32
/2
00
2
st
at
e 
an
d
p
ri
va
te
(i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
tl
y 
on
 b
ei
n
g
ce
rt
if
ie
d
)
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
sc
h
oo
l
55
0
€
fo
r 
th
e
in
it
ia
l 
tw
o
ye
ar
s
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
on
 b
ei
n
g
p
ro
m
ot
ed
p
re
vi
ou
s 
ye
ar
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
e
(I
S
E
E
) 
b
el
ow
17
.7
21
€
1.
05
5.
00
0
€
al
lo
ca
te
d
 i
n
 
th
es
e
sc
h
ol
ar
sh
ip
s
ar
e 
p
ai
d
u
n
d
er
re
gi
on
al
fu
n
d
s.
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
sc
h
ol
ar
sh
ip
s
ar
e 
p
re
se
n
t
u
n
d
er
n
at
io
n
al
fu
n
d
s 
fr
om
la
w
 6
2/
20
00
.
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 83
84 GIORGIO BRUNELLO - DANIELE CHECCHI
T
A
B
L
E
6 
– 
co
n
ti
n
u
e
P
u
gl
ia
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
24
/2
00
0
(r
ep
ea
te
d
w
it
h
 r
eg
io
n
al
la
w
 5
/2
00
4)
n
ot
 a
p
p
li
ed
fo
r 
la
ck
 o
f
fu
n
d
s
S
ic
il
y
ar
t.
3
R
eg
io
n
al
 L
aw
14
/2
00
2
st
at
e 
an
d
ce
rt
if
ie
d
p
ri
va
te
(p
ar
it
ar
ia
)
ki
n
d
er
ga
rt
en
,
p
ri
m
ar
y,
 
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y,
u
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
tu
it
io
n
 a
n
d
cu
rr
ic
u
la
r
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
75
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 i
f
p
er
s.
 i
n
co
m
e
<
 2
/5
 o
f
m
ax
im
u
m
in
co
m
e;
50
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 i
f
2/
5<
p
er
s.
in
co
m
e<
1/
2 
of
m
ax
im
u
m
in
co
m
e;
25
%
 o
f
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 i
f
p
er
s.
in
co
m
e>
1/
2 
of
m
ax
im
u
m
in
co
m
e.
p
er
so
n
al
in
co
m
es
(I
R
P
E
F
)
b
el
ow
 a
m
ax
im
u
m
in
co
m
e
(g
iv
en
 b
y
15
.0
00
€
p
er
st
u
d
en
t 
ch
il
d
+
 1
0.
00
0
€
p
er
ad
d
it
io
n
al
fa
m
il
y
m
em
b
er
)
In
 2
00
3-
4
90
.0
00
ap
p
li
ca
n
ts
1.
18
9
su
cc
es
sf
u
l1
2
17
.0
00
€
al
lo
ca
te
d
th
e 
su
b
si
d
y 
is
n
ot
 p
ai
d
w
h
en
ev
er
 t
h
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
is
 l
es
s 
th
an
26
0
€
12
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
on
s 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
p
ro
vi
n
ce
s 
of
 P
al
er
m
o,
 M
es
si
n
a 
an
d
 C
at
an
ia
 a
re
 s
ti
ll
 t
o 
b
e 
ch
ec
ke
d
.
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 84
SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE 85
proaches illustrated above is satisfactory from an efficiency and equity point
of view. By neglecting student achievement as a requirement for eligibility,
the first approach does not exploit the potential efficiency gains associated
to giving brightest and poor students access to good private schools. By fix-
ing the scholarship amount, the second model does not distinguish between
constrained and unconstrained households, and therefore is at risk of dead-
weight losses. While the first model is clearly regressive, the second risks be-
ing ineffective in enlarging equality of opportunities. 
The difference in the two systems is also evident when we consider the
early decline in the coverage rate in these regions compared to the rest. In
Figure 1, we have considered a standard household with two working par-
ents and one dependent child and have computed the voucher paid accord-
ing to different levels of tuition (from 0.25 thousand to 3 thousand €) and
different family income (from 0 to 150 thousands €). As it can be seen from
the graphs, the Veneto scheme turns out to be the most generous for mod-
est level of tuition, while the Friuli scheme has the lead for higher tuition ex-
penditure. The Lombardy scheme has the highest ceiling, and therefore re-
imburses also the tuition paid by rich households. 
The recent national law follows the former approach and even neglects the
conditionality on family income. Vouchers under this approach do not seem to
be carefully designed to increase the choice set available to households, since
they cover at best only half of the tuition expenditure. They do not provide in-
centives to poor households to use the system of private education, nor solicit
greater effort from the students. Last but not least, all voucher schemes are not
conditional upon the quality of the school attended, whatever measure of qual-
ity may be adopted. Overall, these features suggest the hypothesis that vouch-
ers Italian style are mainly a disguised transfer to private schools.
4.2. Vouchers in Lombardy.
Lombardy is the richest and most populous Italian region, and the first
to introduce regional legislation on school vouchers. School vouchers in Lom-
bardy are subsidies to the tuition fee paid by households with pupils attend-
ing private schools in primary and secondary education. The voucher covers
25% of the total cost of private school tuition, with a cap currently running
at € 1300 per pupil.13 The subsidy is not given to the school, but directly to
13 The cap was originally set to € 1032 (2.000.000 liras) and € 1291 (2.500.000 liras)
for school year 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 respectively. An addition of € 516 (1.000.000 li-
ras) is allowed in case of handicapped children. For the second year the reimbursement rate
was set to 50% for families with incomes below 16.000.000 liras.
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parents,14 and is funded with regional and national resources. The dedicated
fund has two sources: the biggest chunk is provided by the national govern-
ment to several regions as a discretionary fund for regional projects, and the
smallest part comes from regional taxes. The regional law15 introduced a min-
imum threshold of reimbursable expenditure (corresponding to € 206 -
400.000 liras) and allowed a maximum reimbursement corresponding to 25%
of the expenditure per child.16 As a consequence, students attending public
schools were almost completely excluded from the voucher. Only families
who were resident in Lombardy and with per capita net annual income less
than € 30.971 (60.000.000 liras) were entitled to obtain the voucher.
14 The requirements to determine financial eligibility for the voucher as of the 2003-04
school year have been modified, introducing the possibility of a maximum of 50% reim-
bursement for poor families.
15 The initial proposal was approved as “comma 121 of the article 4 of the regional law
n.1 issued on 5/1/2000”. 
16 For the initial year (2000-2001), the list of reimbursable costs was wider, including
tuition and optional activities; transport, meals and books were excluded. For the subse-
quent years, only tuition and specific expenditure for handicapped children were admitted.
FIGURE 1 - Simulations of regional systems of school vouchers
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4.3. Private education in Italy and Lombardy.
Vouchers in Italy apply mainly, if not exclusively, to students enrolled in
private schools. The percentage of students enrolled in these schools is low
by international standards. According to James [1984], the percentage of
young Italian pupils enrolled in primary and secondary private schools in the
early 1980s was equal to 8 and 7 percent respectively, much below the aver-
age 18 and 21.4 percent of advanced industrial societies. More recent data
for Italy and Lombardy are presented in Table 7 below: in the school year
2001-2002, out of the approximately 6.6 million primary and secondary stu-
dents in Italy, 395 thousand attended private schools. The percentage of stu-
dents enrolled in private schools was significantly higher in Lombardy (9.4
percent) than in Italy (5.9 percent). 
Private schools can be divided in two groups, certified schools (scuole
paritarie), that are legally recognized by the central government, and uncer-
tified schools (scuole non paritarie), which do not have such recognition.
Recognition requires that schools receive approval of the curriculum by the
Ministry and allow free admission of (solvent) applicants. In Italy during
2001-2002 there were 1106 primary schools, 593 lower secondary and 1094
upper secondary schools with legal recognition as private schools. Only stu-
dents who attended certified schools could receive the voucher. This explains
why we observe an expansion of the share of certified private schools in the
total number of private schools, which remains almost constant over the
three-year period 2000-2003 (see Table 8).
4.4. The Data.
We obtained from the Lombardy Regional Authority the administrative
data on school voucher applicants for two subsequent years: the initial
school year 2000-2001, when the voucher programme was introduced, and
TABLE 7 – School enrolment according to management type – 
school year 2001-2002. 
STUDENTS IN ITALY STUDENTS IN LOMBARDY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS PRIVATE SCHOOLS PUBLIC SCHOOLS PRIVATE SCHOOLS
primary 2.534.191 184.253 (6.78%) 364.771 31.602 (7.97%)
lower secondary 1.704.479 61.040 (3.46%) 225.284 20.188 (8.22%)
Upper secondary 2.421.303 149.343 (5,81%) 313.009 33.790 (9.74%)
Total 6.659.973 394.636 (5.92%) 903.064 85.580 (9.40%)
Source: MIUR 2003, Scuola non statale: indagine conoscitiva a.s. 2001/02 – private schools include stu-
dents enrolled in both scuole paritarie and scuole non paritarie.
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the subsequent year 2001-2002. Data on voucher applicants contain infor-
mation on family income, number of family components, name, address,
type and class of the school attended, expenditure for school attended and
(possibly) the amount of the voucher obtained. In the Appendix we report a
detailed description of the main features of this dataset.
We infer the tuition charged by private schools from the expenditure
born by households who apply for a voucher. The precision of the inference
clearly depends on the percentage of applicants in each school. The de-
scriptive statistics in Table 9 indicate that tuition rises with school level, and
that confessional schools charge lower fees than other schools. Within up-
per secondary schools, general institutes – such as the lyceum - charge high-
er fees than technical institutes.
Aware of the potential distortion in the data – see the Appendix – we
compute the percentage change in average tuition from the first to the sec-
ond available year: on average tuition went up by 6.98% in all schools and
by 6.35% in upper secondary schools – 4.28 and 3.65 percent in real terms
respectively – and the increase was highest among non confessional sec-
ondary schools (+18.1 percent).
These changes over time do not take into account the voucher. Almost
all applicants were successful and on average each applicant household re-
ceived from the regional government 1067 thousand liras (551 euros) in
2000-2001 and 1225 thousand liras (633 euros) in 2001-2002. If we consid-
er net rather than gross tuition, the former increased over the two years less
than the inflation rate, and the relative net price of private schooling de-
clined on average in real terms by close to one percentage point. In upper
secondary schools, however, the real net fee increased on average by 1.55%,
TABLE 8 – Private schools, certified and not certified – Italy and Lombardy. 
2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
PRIVATE PRIVATE AND PRIVATE PRIVATE AND PRIVATE PRIVATE AND
CERTIFIED CERTIFIED CERTIFIED
(PARITARIE) (PARITARIE) (PARITARIE)
LOMBARDY
primary 232 150 244 206 245 223
lower secondary 172 130 173 163 171 167
upper secondary 325 195 329 255 320 284
ITALY
primary 1670 624 1664 1106 1671 1287
lower secondary 697 405 687 593 680 641
upper secondary 1623 705 1571 1094 1569 1307
Source: MIUR 2004, Relazione al Parlamento sullo stato di attuazione della legge 10/3/2000 n.62 (pro-
tocollo 31/3/2004)
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a combination of the 0.17% increase in confessional schools and the 14.49%
increase in non religious schools. In the last three columns of Table 10 we
have also computed the share of private school tuition on household income
and its variation over the two years. 
We notice a tiny decline in the incidence of schooling expenditure on the
income of households sending their children to private institutions in Lom-
bardy. The caveat here is that we are not observing the entire population of
students attending private schools, but only the sub-sample of households
who applied for a voucher. Ideally, we would have liked to have data on the
entire population enrolled in private schools, in order to analyze the flows
in and out of the private sector. In addition, the restriction of vouchers to a
sub-set of the relevant population and the random allocation of treatment
would have allowed us to implement a serious policy evaluation, based on
the comparison of the control group and the treatment group.17
17 In the pioneer experience of school vouchers in Milwaukee (Wisconsin) in 1990,
vouchers were targeted to low-income families, were only redeemable in private non-sec-
tarian schools and were limited to 1% of the student population. Thanks to an exceeding 
TABLE 9 – Voucher applicants and school tuition – full sample of private
schools – school years 2000-01 and 2001-02. 
SAMPLE OF APPLICANTS APPLICANTS FAMILY FAMILY FEE FEE ∆ FEE
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 2000-01 2001-02 INCOME INCOME 2000 2001 (MEAN %)
2000 2001
All private schools
primary 14727 19227 87425 89715 2795 3066 9.70
lower secondary 9236 13372 88125 89962 4308 4568 6.04
upper secondary 14713 18573 84995 88766 5581 5935 6.35
Total (excluding 38676 51172 260545 268443 12684 13569 6.98%
unclassified schools)
private 
secondary schools
confessional 2254 5270 99950 100372 5586 5841 4.57
high schools 
non religious 2495 3619 97820 98347 5659 6682 18.08
high schools 
confessional 4886 5606 83851 82034 5245 5171 -1.39
technical schools 
non religious 5078 4078 73144 74498 5863 6443 9.88
technical schools 
Total 14713 18573 84995 88766 5581 5935 6.35
Note: negative family incomes (31 in 2000 and 85 in 2001) have been set equal to missing. Source: our
elaboration on administrative data – Regione Lombardia. Income and fees in thousand liras
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Alternatively, we would have been content with a longitudinal sample of
Lombard students, containing information on family background (income and
education – the latter information is completely missing in our dataset), student
performance (once again missing), type of school attended and voucher appli-
cation. In this case, we could have analyzed the determinants of private school
choice – as we have done in Section 2 – before and after the introduction of the
voucher, and see whether the policy has affected household choices. 
We try to get as close as possible to this approach by merging these data
with the data on private schools provided by the Italian Ministry of Education,
which include information on school resources – such as the pupil-teacher ra-
tio, the success rate of enrolled students and some teachers’ characteristics).
We can use the merged data to study two questions: first, by comparing en-
rolled students and voucher applicants, we can ask why do we observe differ-
ent percentages of applicants across schools. Second, we can investigate
whether there is any correlation between change in enrolment, change in fees
and changes in resources. Table 11 reports descriptive evidence on the first
question and shows that in the initial year 2000-01 after the introduction of
the voucher only 38.8% of the students enrolled in private schools applied to
the scheme. The percentage of applicants increased significantly to 60.9% in
the following year. This marked increase is partially the consequence of the
better classification of applications – recall that approximately one third of the
applications in the first year lack the relevant information to assign individual
information to a specific school. Since entitlement depends on household in-
come, the percentage of applicants could also reflect the distribution of income
in private schools. The large variation observed in the application rate within
each year, however, makes it unlikely that this is the full story. We believe that
the application rate could also reflect a learning process, and that learning
could be affected by economic variables, such as the relative cost of private
education, or the type of private schools. Learning, for instance, could be faster
when fees are higher relative to household income. Moreover, some private
schools could provide better services to customers, including information and
consulting on the newly introduced voucher. 
number of applications, the participants in the program were randomly selected, and the
non-selected applicants represented an appropriate control group. With reference to the
Milwaukee experience, Rouse writes: “In order to estimate the true effect of choice schools,
one must control for family background (such as family income and parental education)
and student ability. The goal is to control for all individual characteristics that are corre-
lated with attending the choice school and explain higher test scores such that the only dif-
ference between the two groups of students is whether or not they have enrolled in a choice
school. In general, the more similar the two groups of students are to begin with, the more
credible the evaluation of the program.” (Rouse 1998, p.5).
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We use the administrative data for the school year 2001-2002 to estimate
the relationship between the percentage of voucher applicants on enrolled
students in each upper secondary school and empirical measures of school
quality and household income. To avoid having a bounded dependent vari-
able, we use a logistic transformation of the percentage of applicants. As
shown in Table 12, the results suggest that the percentage of voucher appli-
cants in each school is positively correlated with the school average promo-
tion rate, the percentage of experienced teachers in the school and the con-
fessional school dummy, and negatively correlated with the lyceum dummy,
the size of the school and the pupil–teacher ratio. There is no significant cor-
relation between application for vouchers and lagged household income. If
we interpret a higher promotion rate, a higher share of experienced teach-
ers and a lower pupil–teacher ratio as indicators of better school quality,
these results point to a positive correlation between measured school qual-
ity and the application rate. We explain this correlation with the fact that
schools of better quality provide better services to students, including infor-
mation and consulting on vouchers. 
TABLE 12 – Estimates of voucher application. Dependent variable: 
logistic transformation of the percentage of pupils applying for vouchers. 
Secondary schools. 2001-02.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS
Lagged household income -0.034 
(0.07)
Confessional school 0.375*
(1.78)
Lyceum -1.709***
(3.67)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.018**
(2.25)
Pass rate
1.764***
(2.75)
Size -0.352**
(2.01)
Percentage of teachers with at least 
three years of experience 0.467
(1.31)
Province Yes
Type of school Yes
Integrated school Yes
N.obs 208
R2 0.281
Note: one, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence;
t-values within parentheses.
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When we consider the variations over time of prices and quantities in
the market for upper secondary private education (see Table 13), we notice
that the gross real tuition fee has increased, the real net tuition fee has de-
clined and the number of enrolled pupils has also declined over the two
available years. In a traditional demand-supply framework, this outcome re-
quires a negative supply shift. We discuss demand and supply in next Sec-
tion.
TABLE 13 – Change in enrolment and tuition and demand/supply shifters –
private schools in Lombardy (weighed mean %). 
Sub-sample of private ∆student ∆ real ∆real ∆real family ∆certified 
schools with information enrolment tuition tuition net income teachers
on school resources of voucher
in both years and more 
than five applicants
private secondary schools
confessional high school 2.27 0.58 -0.18 -2.15 0.29
non religious high school -4.33 1.58 0.77 -5.33 0.02
confessional techn.school -2.03 1.61 -1.53 2.54 -0.02
non religious techn.school -5.17 2.33 -0.18 4.04 0.33
Total -1.79 1.41 -0.48 -0.45 0.17
Source: our elaboration on administrative data – Regione Lombardia and Ministry of Education
5. DO VOUCHERS AFFECT TUITION AND ENROLMENT RATES?
The common view on vouchers is that they affect individual school
choice by removing the liquidity constraints that restrict it to cheap and of-
ten low quality (public) schools. If vouchers trigger a reallocation of students
from public to private schools, we expect enrolment in the latter type of
schools to increase over time. The size of this effect depends both on the
price elasticity of household demand for private schools and on the response
of tuition fees to the introduction of vouchers. In the extreme case where pri-
vate schools rise tuition fees to appropriate the entire subsidy, liquidity con-
straints are unaffected and consequently enrolment does not change. In the
more general case, the subsidy is distributed between producers and con-
sumers, as illustrated by Figure 2. 
The evaluation of the treatment effect – the voucher – on the outcome
of interest – enrolment in a private school – requires a counterfactual, and
inference on the causal effect of vouchers should be based on the compari-
son for the same individual of the outcome after treatment with the outcome
that would have been observed in the absence of treatment. This compari-
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son is usually not feasible in social sciences, and the natural alternative to
the counterfactual is to find a comparison group. In a randomised experi-
ment, the treatment and control groups are randomly drawn from the pop-
ulation. In observational studies, however, endogenous selection into treat-
ment can seriously bias evaluation. If we can condition the treatment and
comparison groups on a set of pre-treatment characteristics such that the
outcome in the absence of treatment is independent of the treatment itself,
then we can estimate the average treatment effect on the treated with a “dif-
ference in difference” estimator, which compares the outcomes before and
after treatment across groups (see Wooldridge, 2000).
In our specific case, a candidate comparison group could be the house-
holds who are not eligible for the voucher because of their high household
income18. Assuming that there is no complete sorting of households to
schools based on income, so that the “common support” condition does
not fail, we could compare the propensity of the treated and of the control
group to enrol in a private school. Unfortunately, this is not possible with
18 This is correct only if households do not adjust their income to become eligible.
supply of
private
education
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demand of 
private
education
private education
tu
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FIGURE 2 - Effect of a generic voucher on tuition and enrolment.
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our data, because we only observe voucher applicants and recipients19.
Therefore, we cannot make any reliable statement on the causal effects of
vouchers, and must limit ourselves in this Section to arguments that are
suggestive at best.
We start by remarking that the adjustment of prices and quantities to
the voucher can be time consuming. Households who are eligible for vouch-
ers may take time both to learn about the voucher, as discussed above, and
to change the school choice of their offspring. Moreover, changes can be dif-
ficult after enrolment in the initial grades20. This is particularly so when leg-
islation is enacted after the scholastic year has started, as for vouchers in
Lombardy. In this case it is reasonable to expect that little action occurs dur-
ing the first year, and that any eventual change in tuition and enrolment
takes place from the second year onwards. 
With this maintained assumption in mind, we compute the average
change of tuition and enrolment in the private schools of Lombardy between
2000-01 and 2001-02. We focus on upper secondary schools, because of da-
ta quality. Moreover, since we do not have data on average tuition by school,
we proxy this information with the average tuition paid by voucher appli-
cants in the school of reference.
We find that in our cross – section of schools real tuition and enrolment
have respectively increased and decreased in the two-years period by 1.41
and 1.79 percent (see Table 13). These changes are relatively small and are
consistent with an upward shift of the supply curve and a downward shift
of the demand curve in Figure 2, as depicted in Figure 3.
On the one hand, the negative supply shift could be induced by higher
costs of supplying private education or by a higher mark - up on marginal
costs induced by the voucher. On the other hand, the negative demand shift
could be attributed to negative demographic effects associated to population
ageing. Figure 4 shows the change in average tuition and enrolment in four
groups of schools, with each group identified by the religious affiliation and
the type of education (general versus technical). There seems to be some in-
dication that the relationship between tuition and enrolment is negative in
general schools and positive in technical institutions.
We try to extract from our school – level data some suggestive infor-
mation on the response of the demand for and the supply of private edu-
cation to the introduction of vouchers by specifying and estimating a stan-
19 An alternative control group could be that of households residing in neighbouring
areas where the voucher does not apply.
20 Pomini and Rangone, 2004, evaluate the Italian voucher system by using an ap-
proach based on transaction costs.
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dard demand and supply model. In this model, the demand for private ed-
ucation in school i depends on the net average tuition fee, on the average
household income of enrolled students and on quality considerations, and
the supply of school i depends on the average gross tuition fee, on quality
and other resources necessary to provide education services to the cus-
tomers. In symbols
(1)
where F is (log) tuition, N is the (log) number of students enrolled in private
schools, Y is (log) family income of enrolled pupils, Q is the percentage of
F F v
N F Y Q R
N F Q R T
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FIGURE 3 - The impact of the voucher on tuition and enrolment.
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certified teachers, our selected measure of school quality, R is an indicator
of the religious orientation of the school (confessional or not), T is the num-
ber of teachers in the school, a proxy of school size, ν is the average vouch-
er and i is the index for schools. Given the logarithmic notation, , where
t is the subsidy rate (0.25 in our case).21 Since we have no measure of aver-
age tuition and household income at the school level, we proxy these two
variables with the average tuition and household income of voucher appli-
cants by school.
With endogenous prices and quantities, identification requires that at
least one exogenous variable should be excluded from each equation. Our
strategy is based on the following two assumptions:
i) the supply of places in private schools does not depend on the aver-
age household income of enrolled students. While private schools
may prefer to attract pupils from high-income households, or, alter-
ν =
−



ln
1
1 t
21 Model (1) explains how demand and supply by established schools vary with tuition
fees and the voucher, but is silent on the establishment of new private schools. 
FIGURE 4 - Changes of enrolment and net tuition. By type of school.
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natively, pupils from wealthier households may self-sort into private
schools,22it is not clear why schools, which cater to higher income
households, should have a higher number of pupils than other pri-
vate schools;
ii) the log number of teachers – a proxy of school size – affects supply
but has no effect on demand, once we have controlled for school qual-
ity and household income. Demand clearly depends on perceived
school quality, but should not be affected by the size of the school,
captured by the number of teachers. 
The estimate of model (1) can provide valuable information on the price
elasticities of demand and supply, which can be used to evaluate the impact
of school vouchers on the number of students enrolled in private schools and
on tuition fees. To illustrate, if the parameter β is close to zero and the elas-
ticity is very low, the demand for private education is expected to remain con-
stant when the net fee declines. In this case, we cannot expect the voucher to
increase competition among schools, and the policy ends up as a redistribu-
tion device in favour of relatively well-off households. If on the other hand
the estimated parameter β is positive and high, the demand for private edu-
cation responds to tuition, and a voucher can increase the share of private
schools in education, and possibly foster competition between private and
public schools. By the same token, the more elastic the demand relative to
supply, the higher the share of the subsidy appropriated by private schools.
We estimate separately the demand for and the supply of upper sec-
ondary private education on the data for the school year 2001-2002, and
present the results in Tables 14 and 15. The demand price should be average
tuition net of the voucher, and we use this price as our dependent variable
in the first two columns of Table 14. Nevertheless, since not all households
take advantage of the voucher, in the third and fourth columns we also re-
port the estimates based on gross fees. 
Because the fee is endogenous, we instrument it with the lagged fee and
the proportion of certified teachers in the previous year. The regression al-
so includes dummies for the type of secondary school, the type of recogni-
22 There is weak evidence that some schools charge differentiated fees according to the
ability to pay of families. By regressing the tuition onto family income (and a year control)
in each upper secondary school, and then taking the average estimated coefficient across
schools, yields a median estimate of 0.005. However, out of 293 estimates, only 33 are sta-
tistically significant (t-statistics above two), and 7 out of them are negative coefficients. In
any case, one should not forget that we are observing a truncated distribution of family in-
comes.
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tion by the central government and the province of school location. For both
specifications – with net and gross fees – we propose a static version, which
excludes the lagged value of the dependent variable (first and third columns)
and a dynamic version, which includes the lagged dependent variable (sec-
ond and fourth columns). When significant, the estimated coefficients al-
ways attract the correct sign. We find that the static demand for private ed-
ucation depends negatively on the price and positively on average household
income, on the religious orientation of the school and on the proportion of
certified teachers. On the other hand, the dynamic model suggests that the
adjustment of demand to prices and quality variables is very sluggish, as the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is not statistically different from
one. In this case, the necessary condition for the long-run equilibrium to ex-
ist, β < 1, is violated. Therefore, we use the estimates of the static demand
model for the comparative statics. 
TABLE 14 – Estimates of the demand for private education – Upper secondary
schools – 2001-02 – robust standard errors. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOG PUPILS LOG PUPILS LOG PUPILS LOG PUPILS
Net fee (log of) -0.464*** -0.105***
(3.03) (-2.54)
Gross fee (log of) -0.501*** -0.114***
(3.33) (2.66)
Family income (log of) 0.977*** 0.155* 0.956*** 0.151*
(3.82) (1.65) (3.79) (1.63)
Proportion of certified teachers 0.428** -0.053 0.427 0.055
(2.27) (0.66) (2.27) (0.66)
Confessional school 0.116 0.046 0.118 0.046
(1.43) (1.49) (1.47) (1.50)
Pupils(-1) (log of) — 0.958*** — 0.957***
(30.04) (30.04)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of school Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of recognition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property of schools Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 203 203 203 205
Hansen J 0.37 [0.54] 6.95 [0.01] 0.29 [0.58] 7.27 [0.01]
R2 0.33 0.91 0.33 0.91
Note: Instruments: tuition of the previous year, proportion of certified teachers of previous year and
provincial dummies. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent lev-
el of confidence; t-values within parentheses
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We also estimate static and a dynamic version of the supply equation,
and instrument the gross fee with average household income, after includ-
ing the same set of dummies used in the demand function. The estimates in
Table 15 suggest that supply depends positively on the gross fee, on the log
number of teachers and on the confessional status. There is no statistically
significant relationship between supply and the percentage of certified teach-
ers. Moreover, as in the case of demand, the estimated coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable is very high and not statistically different from
one. Confessional schools offer more admissions – possibly because they face
lower marginal costs – and the number of teachers positively affects the sup-
ply of private education, as in any standard education production function. 
Both demand and supply price elasticities conform to theoretical ex-
pectations, with the elasticity of supply exceeding by far that of demand.
Therefore, households appropriate a larger share of the voucher than private
schools. By solving the system (1) with respect to the gross fee, we get
(2)F
Y Q R T
i
s i i i i
i=
−
+
+
+ −( ) + −( ) −
+
+
+
α σ
η β
γ δ θ ρ ϕ τ
η β
β
β η ν
TABLE 15 – Estimates of the supply of private education – Upper secondary
schools – 2001-02 – robust standard errors. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOG PUPILS LOG PUPILS
Gross fee (log of) 2.164*** 0.321*
(2.80) (1.69)
Proportion of certified teachers 0.371 -0.113
(1.40) (1.28)
Confessional school 0.487*** 0.120***
(3.01) (2.60)
Teachers (log of) 0.464*** 0.105***
(3.78) (2.97)
Pupils(-1) (log of) — 0.954***
(20.84)
Constant Yes Yes
Province Yes Yes
Type of school Yes Yes
Property of school Yes Yes
Type of recognition Yes Yes
Observations 205 205
R2 (centred) -0.50 0.90
Note: Instrument: family income (log of). One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10,
5 and 1 percent level of confidence; t-values within parentheses
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This expression can be used to compute the multiplier effects associated to
the introduction of vouchers, using the estimates of the static models in Ta-
bles 14 and 15 to evaluate the parameters in (2). Our estimates imply that
about 17% of the voucher in Lombardy is likely to be appropriated by pri-
vate schools via higher tuition, and that the remaining 83% is going to be
taken by households as lower net tuition fees. 
Our results also suggest that gross tuition after the introduction of a 25%
voucher should increase in the new equilibrium by about 5%23, which is not
far from the 4.1% observed nominal increase one year after the introduction
of vouchers..Net tuition, on the other hand, should decrease by 23%, much
more than the observed decline after one year (-3.2%). Finally, our estimates
predict that enrolment in private schools should rise by 10% in the new equi-
librium, in spite of the temporary decline by 1.4% experienced after one
year.24
We conclude from these estimates that the introduction of vouchers in
Lombardy should increase both tuition fees – by close to 5 percent – and en-
rolment in private schools – by about 10 percent, which corresponds to 2405
students for the sub-sample of private schools studied in this paper. These
changes are noteworthy but will take time to materialize, especially for en-
rolment. While gross fees are close to their new long-run equilibrium values
only one year after the introduction of vouchers, enrolment is still far from
the target, and has even temporarily declined. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has reviewed the recent Italian experience with school vouch-
ers. We have examined national and regional policy and used administrative
data from the largest region involved, Lombardy, to describe the initial ad-
justment of households and schools to the introduction of vouchers. Since
the data at hand cover only the first two years from implementation and do
not include a control group not affected by the policy, our analysis can only
be suggestive.. 
Our key findings can be summarized as follows:
a) we doubt that Italian private schools are on average of better qual-
ity than public schools. If anything, the evidence points to the con-
trary and to the fact that many private schools in this country op-
23
24 ∆ ∆Ns =
+
⋅ =
⋅
+
⋅
−



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erate as remedial schools for the less talented offspring of wealthy
households;
b) there is evidence that the percentage of voucher applicants is higher
the higher the average quality of private schools. We tentatively ex-
plain this with the fact that better quality schools provide better serv-
ices to students, including information and consulting on vouchers; 
c) enrolment in private schools responds sluggishly to changes in tu-
ition induced by vouchers. If the current policy is permanent, we ex-
pect gross tuition to rise by 5 percent and enrolment in private
schools to increase by 10 percent as a result of the introduction of
vouchers;
d) there is limited impact (both in the short run and in the long run) of
vouchers on gross tuition fees, and the subsidy is mainly appropriat-
ed by households. This finding does not support the view that private
schools will respond to vouchers by increasing tuition in a substan-
tial way, and does not justify the introduction of ceilings to private
school fees. 
If private schools are not on average more productive than public
schools, in terms of the development of cognitive and affective skills, then
one important efficiency argument in favour of vouchers does not apply.
There might be other efficiency-enhancing effects over the long-run, but we
cannot assess them with the current data. In the extreme case of no effi-
ciency gains, vouchers Italian style could only produce redistribution of in-
come away from the taxpayer to the wealthy households who enrol their off-
spring in private schools.
The fact that vouchers trigger higher tuition fees could be interpreted as
a violation of Italian Constitutional Law, which forbids the public funding
of private schools. In this case the funding is indirect, and works its way
through the voucher, which is partly appropriated by private schools via
higher gross tuition. Notice, however, that higher prices need not imply high-
er profits per head, as more enrolment could increase average costs. 
It is difficult with our data and results to assess precisely the welfare ef-
fects of vouchers. If the policy is revenue neutral, vouchers must be funded
either by redistributing public expenditure or by additional taxes. The house-
holds who receive the voucher are not necessarily better off if they need to
pay higher taxes or to give up part of the government transfers they received
before the voucher. One might think that the large majority of households
who do not receive the voucher, either because they are too well – off or be-
cause they enrol their children in public schools, is worse off, either because
of the higher taxes or because of the lower government transfers. This ig-
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nores, however, the possibility that the performance of public schools im-
prove as a consequence of vouchers. Finally, private schools are not neces-
sarily better off, as discussed above, because the higher gross tuition could
be used to compensate higher average costs due to increased enrolment. 
It is also an open question whether the 10 percent increase in the en-
rolment of pupils in private schools will trigger efficiency gains in poorly per-
forming public schools. Better performance in public schools might require
adequate incentives not only for schools – by linking for instance funding to
the number of enrolled students – but also for teachers. There is a broad con-
sensus in the relevant literature that the quality and performance of teach-
ers is the key factor for school quality (see Hanushek, 2002). 
Accountability, merit pay, testing, training and selection of teachers are
important key words for those who take seriously the depressing results of
international surveys – such as PISA – on the average performance of Ital-
ian schools. Unfortunately, the political resistance in this country to meas-
ures that could improve the performance of public schools is at least as high
as the scepticism on the role of vouchers. 
It is not for us to say whether this paper will contribute to increase or
to reduce such scepticism. We are aware that a proper evaluation of the
causal effects of vouchers on enrolment and tuition fees does require better
data and a careful research design. We view our contribution as a prelimi-
nary introduction to this important exercise.
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APPENDIX – DATA DESCRIPTION
We obtained from the Lombardy Regional Authority the administrative da-
ta on school voucher applicants for two subsequent years: the initial school
year 2000-2001, when the voucher programme was introduced, and the
subsequent year 2001-2002. From the original file with 57.704 records for
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2000-2001 and 57.134 records for 2001-2002, we were able to identify
56.650 and 51.438 students enrolled in private schools respectively25. A mi-
nority of these students was dropped because they were not entitled to ap-
ply. As a consequence, we are left with 55.560 applicants for the first year
and 51.234 for the second year. Data on voucher applicants contain infor-
mation on family income, number of family components, name, address,
type and class of the school attended, expenditure for school attended and
(possibly) the amount of the voucher obtained.26 The numbers in Table 7
show that our data cover approximately 2/3 of private school enrolment in
Lombardy.27
A drawback of the administrative data is that they do not contain the
number of pupils in each private school, but only the number of applicants
to the voucher. Because of this, we merge these data with the data on pri-
vate schools provided by the Italian Ministry of Education, which include
information on school resources – such as the pupil-teacher ratio, the suc-
cess rate of enrolled students and some teachers’ characteristics). Of the 736
private schools in Lombardy and in the archives of the Minister of Educa-
tion – 246 primary, 173 lower secondary and 317 upper secondary – 39
schools did not appear in the administrative data on voucher applicants –
18 primary, 5 lower secondary and 16 upper secondary. Unfortunately, pri-
vate schools are not compelled to provide the Ministry of Education with
this information, and therefore there are a significant number of missing
cases. Table A.2 shows the distribution of certified schools in Lombardy and
in our sample (last column). There are many missing values in primary and
lower secondary schools, but much better data for upper secondary schools.
Therefore we will focus only on the latter type of schools in our empirical
analysis. 
25 In year 2001-2002 we had to exclude 4813 records where school information was ab-
sent and 5 records where the voucher exceeded family expenditure. All individuals report-
ed to have obtained a positive contribution. The average family income of excluded house-
holds was 84.259.735 liras, and the average contribution 1.257.337 liras. The corresponding
figures for the retained sample are 89.015.015 liras and 1.645.618 liras respectively. 
26 As it can be seen from the first line of Table A.1, the type of school attended is not
always available, especially in the file for the first year. This is mainly due to the presence
of integrated schools (scuole integrate, i.e. schools including all school levels). When we ex-
clude integrated schools from the sample, the percentage of undefined school levels drops
to 1.09% in 2000-01 and goes to zero in the following year. 
27 We have been unable to find the exact number of students enrolled in private schools
in Lombardy during the academic year 2000-2001. National figures (including autonomous
provinces – Val d’Aosta, Trento and Bolzano) indicate a total number of pupils of 521.626
for academic year 2000-1 and 530.542 for the following year, suggesting a rising trend in
enrolment.
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In order to investigate whether schools with non missing values in the
administrative dataset represent a distorted sample of the private school
population, we have compared in Table A.3 three features of schools: tuition,
average household income of voucher applicants and average school size. We
notice that the sub-sample of private schools reporting information on
school resources – columns (7) and (8) in the table – have higher tuition fees
than the sample of private schools in the administrative data – columns (1)
and (2) in the table, with the difference driven by the over-representation of
upper secondary schools, which charge higher fees. Similarly, we do not find
significant differences in average family incomes or in school size – proxied
by the number of voucher applicants – between the sample of voucher ap-
plicants and the sample drawn from the Ministry of Education.
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COMMENT:
“SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE”
GIUSEPPE BERTOLA
(Università di Torino)
15 February 2005
This nice paper offers a wealth of information on the Italian education
system, focusing in particular on recent voucher schemes implemented at
the regional level. Its value added ranges much beyond assessing such
schemes’ implications. The paper aims at such an assessment and does so
competently, adopting appropriate theoretical perspectives and suitable
techniques. I appreciate its discussion of the impact of vouchers on distri-
bution and educational quality in a status quo situation where private
schools offer remedial education to customers privileged by money more
than by talent or cultural background, and I very much agree with its broad
assessment of vouchers’ theoretical effects and political desirability in that
context. 
Due to data limitations, however, the analysis and results cannot be de-
finitive. Accordingly, my comments focus on the methodological and con-
ceptual context in which the paper’s value added is best appreciated, and
briefly review promising directions of further research opened by its com-
petent preliminary analysis. 
Education is an extremely important field of public policy. State pro-
duction and/or financing of education by more or less obvious market fail-
ures, ranging from the largely public character of primary education meant
to instill minimal social and behavioral skills, to the collective value of in-
dependent certification of skills and talent, and to credit market imperfec-
tions hampering poor households’ investment in productive skills which are
both privately and socially valuable. 
The latter financial market imperfections play an important role in this
context. Much empirical and theoretical work has focused on the fact that
education, unlike apples and oranges, increases its purchasers’ future rather
than current utility. Borrowing constraints may prevent purchase of educa-
tion by currently poor children, and deprive both them and society of future
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productivity. Targeted subsidies, possibly in the form of vouchers paid to
families, can address this market failure. If only financial considerations pre-
vent markets from allowing individual decisions to maximize overall welfare
and distribute it optimally, relatively simple tax-and-subsidy policies can im-
prove both distribution and efficiency.  
If markets function well once the intertemporal distortions are correct-
ed then vouchers, by allowing private choice to enforce competition among
schools, would have important advantages over public-sector production of
education. On the one hand, immunity from competitive pressure can re-
duce the efficiency of public production, for lack of appropriate incentives
and instruments on the part of public school managers and workers. On the
other hand, if choices are not open to its customers then a public or heavi-
ly regulated schooling system may be unable to cater to students’ different
needs, to provide subtly different varieties of education. 
But the market solution to education need not be perfect in other im-
portant respects. On the demand side, the quality of education is even more
difficult to evaluate than that of most investment projects. Since only noisy
indicators of education’s contribution to individual productivity are observ-
able (and may take 20 years to realize), it is not surprising that financial mar-
kets hesitate to fund it. And the same informational imperfections are sure-
ly problematic in decentralized provision of education in markets where cus-
tomers have little or no experience of the product’s quality, and competition
is very much imperfect in the presence of market power generated by non-
contestable reputation. 
On the supply side, not only market inputs but also the quality of fellow
students matter: unlike the factors used to produce physical consumption
and investment goods, schools’  “peer effects” are not directly chosen by sup-
pliers but result from customers’ choices, very imperfectly mediated by per-
formance-based school fees and other forms of price differentiation. The re-
sulting coordination problems may be more serious (and certainly have
more serious consequences) than in the case of other services subject to, for
example, congestion effects. In the presence of such problems, more com-
petition does not necessarily increase welfare. Relaxing liquidity constraints
remains desirable, but if lack of information prevents individuals from
choosing appropriately then vouchers that allow choice need not improve ef-
ficiency. 
It is therefore extremely useful to assess the relative importance of pub-
lic-sector and market-generated inefficiencies, and it would be very impor-
tant to bring such an assessment to bear on the case of Italy, where the gov-
ernment considers National voucher schemes despite a constitutional pro-
hibition of private school financing, and conflicting reforms and counter-re-
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forms of school curricula modify the timing and character of choices be-
tween vocational and academic tracks. 
Education policies, however, have not been adequately analyzed outside
of the United States. This is particularly unfortunate because the structure
of the American educational system is very different in many important re-
spects from that of European countries and, in particular, Italy. Publicly
funded and centrally organized education is much more prevalent in Italy,
where school degrees are legally recognized in a highly regulated labor mar-
ket, than in the US, where public education is largely funded by local prop-
erty taxes and many private schools offer better-quality education to rela-
tively rich families living in poor urban areas. 
On the one hand, lack of adequate scientific work on the economics of
education in the Italian and other non-Anglo Saxon countries, forsakes im-
portant opportunities to pin down the effects of public policies. On the oth-
er hand, it may tempt policymakers to apply to Italian reality empirical find-
ings from very different US experiences. 
This paper offers valuable evidence that such unwarranted extrapolation
would be very inappropriate. In Italy, consistently with casual observation
and earlier evidence, private schools play a remedial role: they are chosen
by, and appear helpful to, early-starters and other students who need special
attention. Thus, vouchers may allow poorer special-need students to access
suitable facilities but need not improve the overall quality of the system’s ed-
ucational output. From this perspective, the widely heterogeneous generos-
ity and conditionality of regional voucher schemes offers a wealth of more
or less “natural” experiments. Unfortunately the valuable information that
might be generated by observation of region-specific outcomes is wasted, as
data fail to be collected, documented, and made available for evaluation pur-
poses. Ignorance confines political debates to sterile fights over resource al-
location, with little or no attention to broader repercussions through incen-
tives for individual behavior and market interactions. 
The Lombardia voucher-application data, analyzed in the paper in con-
junction with some other school-specific information, offer tantalizing
glimpses into how useful and informative evaluation might be. Unfortu-
nately, the available data are too imprecise and incomplete to offer more
than glimpses. The paper provides some indication of whether the impact of
subsidies fell on demand or supply prices, or on quantities. But a single
cross-section of changes does not allow estimation of structural parameters
in a world where schools interact with each other in (segmented) markets,
and school-specific demand and supply schedules are disturbed by unknown
factors during the single observation period. While the results should be (and
are) appropriately qualified and discounted, the analysis has important
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methodological value, and highlights how productive research could be if it
could exploit longer time series and better information as to the crucial
“quality” dimension of educational services.
In summary, the paper offers to its readers a thought-provoking set of
basic facts and a very useful conceptual framework for thinking about em-
pirical assessment of public policies in the presence of education market fail-
ures. The next steps in this line of research will hopefully be able to access
more abundant and reliable data. They could fruitfully focus on character-
izing private choices and educational outcomes in realistic situations where
imperfect information hampers market interactions, and seek insights into
the role played by public-sector provision of specific school types (such as
the high-quality public Licei in Italy) and State certification of school
achievements (valore legale of school-issued diplomas).
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COMMENTO
“SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE”
SANDRO TRENTO1
Il lavoro di Brunello e di Checchi (BC, d’ora in poi) è interessante so-
prattutto perché affronta un tema di grande rilievo nel dibattito sulle politi-
che per innalzare la qualità dell’istruzione, quello relativo all’impiego di vou-
chers. In particolare, gli Autori si prefiggono una valutazione delle politiche
messe in pratica, di recente, da alcune Regioni  italiane.
Va detto che fare policy evaluation nel caso delle politiche per l’istruzio-
ne è un’operazione non agevole in quanto non è facile reperire i dati neces-
sari e non è semplice identificare nessi tra l’intervento pubblico e i risultati
scolastici che si vogliono valutare.
Alcune amministrazioni regionali italiane hanno introdotto, negli scor-
si anni, forme di sussidio alle famiglie che intendono iscrivere i propri figli
a scuole private, sotto forma di buoni-scolastici (vouchers) utilizzabili per
pagare in parte le rette scolastiche.
1. LA QUALITÀ DELLE SCUOLE PRIVATE ITALIANE.
Nella sezione 2 del paper di BC si intende valutare la qualità delle scuo-
le private. Questo primo passo preliminare è ritenuto importante da BC per
stabilire se davvero è auspicabile incentivare le iscrizioni alle scuole private.
In linea teorica, l’uso di vouchers da parte dei governi non implica necessa-
riamente che debbano essere usati per favorire le scuole private. Nel caso in
questione tuttavia i buoni-scolastici sono finalizzati ad accrescere le oppor-
tunità di iscrizione alle scuole private italiane.
Il primo problema che viene sollevato da BC è il modo in cui può esse-
re definita e misurata la qualità di una scuola.
La qualità di una scuola è misurabile in termini della qualità media de-
gli studenti di quella stessa scuola, ossia dei risultati scolastici conseguiti da-
gli alunni di quella stessa scuola. Questo è ciò che sostengono BC. Tuttavia
1 Banca d’Italia, Servizio Studi. Le opinioni contenute nel testo sono da attribuirsi in
via esclusiva all’autore.
03-brunello/checchi  9-02-2005  10:57  Pagina 114
SCHOOL VOUCHERS ITALIAN STYLE 115
questa valutazione non può prescindere da quella degli input della scuola va-
le a dire dalla qualità media degli insegnanti e da quella delle dotazioni in-
frastrutturali (biblioteche, laboratori, palestre, etc.) di cui dispone la scuola
stessa. L’ampia letteratura sui peer effects che suggerisce andrebbe tenuto
conto della qualità iniziale degli studenti stessi e sulla loro composizione per
condizioni socio economiche.
Il punto centrale infatti è dato dal fatto che, come dimostrato in prece-
denti lavori da Bertola e Checchi (2004), le scuole private italiane avrebbe-
ro la natura particolare di essere degli istituti di recupero scolastico per que-
gli allievi svogliati e /o meno dotati intellettualmente ma appartenenti a fa-
miglie economicamente agiate. In media quindi gli studenti che in Italia ten-
dono a iscriversi alle scuole private sono quelli meno bravi, quelli che sono
già stati respinti nelle valutazioni a fine anno delle scuole pubbliche o che
con più alta probabilità lo sarebbero se si iscrivessero a istituti pubblici.
Nel confronto tra scuole private e scuole pubbliche italiane va quindi te-
nuto conto del fatto che c’è un fenomeno di auto-selezione (sorting) che spin-
ge gli studenti meno bravi ma ricchi a scegliere le scuole private. I cattivi ri-
sultati scolastici conseguiti in media dagli studenti delle scuole private in Ita-
lia, indice secondo BC della  peggiore qualità media delle scuole private ita-
liane rispetto  a quelle pubbliche, potrebbe in realtà essere dovuto alla più
scarsa qualità media degli studenti che si frequentano le scuole private e non
alla più bassa qualità delle scuole private stesse. Gli insegnanti delle scuole
private potrebbero essere altrettanto bravi di quelli che lavorano nelle scuo-
le pubbliche ma i mediocri risultati conseguiti dagli studenti degli istituti
privati sarebbero dovuti al processo di auto-selezione.
Se si tiene conto di possibili peer effects il risultato potrebbe peggiorare
ulteriormente. Il rendimento scolastico degli studenti potrebbe dipendere
anche dall’interazione che ciascun studente ha con i propri compagni di clas-
se. C’è crescente evidenza empirica che questi peer effects esistano ma non è
ancora chiaro che tipo di interazione sia prevalente2.
2 Le scuole sembrano esserne consapevoli soprattutto negli Stati Uniti e nel Regno Uni-
to, e le stesse famiglie ne sembrano avere contezza nella scelta della scuola alla quale iscri-
vere il proprio figlio. Questo significa che tendenzialmente le famiglie vogliono iscrivere i
propri figli nelle scuole nelle quali si aspettano che i propri figli abbiano la “migliore” in-
terazione possibile con gli altri studenti. Le stesse scuole se autorizzate a seguire politiche
selettive nell’ammissione degli allievi favoriranno questo processo di sorting degli allievi.
Tendenzialmente quindi la maggiore possibilità di scelta da parte delle famiglie e da parte
delle scuole dovrebbe condurre a forme di “segregazione”: le famiglie degli allievi più bra-
vi tenderanno a voler iscrivere i propri figli nelle scuole nelle quali è più probabile che an-
che gli altri allievi siano più bravi e saranno addirittura disposte a fare cross-subsidization
a favore delle famiglie di altri allievi più bravi ma meno ricche: pagheranno rete alte che in 
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La ricerca empirica dovrebbe stabilire quale tipo di effetto è prevalente.
Alcuni osservano però che distinguere tra “bravi” e “non bravi” è trop-
po semplicistico. Quello che conta è la distanza tra gli studenti in termini di
capacità innate, di caratteristiche sociali, etc.: per gli studenti bravi intera-
gire con quelli appena meno bravi può rappresentare una sfida, un’occasio-
ne per imparare mediante l’insegnamento. Altro aspetto che sembrerebbe
contare è il numero di studenti di talento diverso che si fanno interagire tra
loro. Sembrerebbe che se si inseriscono pochi allievi meno bravi in classi di
più bravi prevale l’effetto benefico sul rendimento di questi allievi meno bra-
vi. Viceversa se si inserisce un solo allievo bravo in una classe di meno bra-
vi, quest’unico studente bravo vedrebbe peggiorare il proprio rendimento
scolastico. Le non linearità possono dipendere quindi dalla distanza e dal nu-
mero di studenti di ciascun tipo (Winston e Zimmerman 2003).
Nella loro analisi,  BC non riescono a distinguere l’effetto scuola dal-
l’effetto studente. Se è vero che le scuole private italiane sono scuole di nic-
chia specializzate nel fornire un sistema di recupero per gli studenti abbienti
ma meno dotati, vuol dire che c’è un’autoselezione negativa  che a parità di
qualità degli insegnanti conduce a risultati peggiori nei test tipo PISA som-
ministrati agli studenti delle scuole private italiane. 
La peggiore qualità delle scuole private italiane non è quindi dimostra-
ta in modo convincente da BC. 
Per dare una valutazione più corretta sulla qualità delle scuole sarebbe
necessario, ad esempio:
parte finiranno per finanziare borse di studio a favore di allievi poveri ma bravi; questo è
quanto accade negli Stati Uniti, nel Regno Unito etc. Per converso si avranno scuole nelle
quali finiranno solo allievi meno bravi ossia casi di “segregazione”. La rilevanza di questo
genere di fenomeno dipende dall’ipotesi che facciamo sulla natura del peer effect:
– Se il peer effects è lineare o simmetrico: cioè se il guadagno di rendimento medio di
cui beneficeranno gli studenti bravi dal fatto di stare tutti insieme è esattamente com-
pensato dal minore rendimento medio che avranno gli allievi meno bravi dallo sta-
re con soli allievi meno bravi si ha una pure redistribuzione. La segregazione avreb-
be un puro fondamento ideologico.
– Se i peer effects non sono lineari cioè se sono asimmetrici si possono avere vari ca-
si: a) gli studenti deboli ad esempio potrebbero guadagnare dall’interazione con i
bravi più di quanto i bravi perdono dal non poter interagire solo con i bravi: McPher-
son e Schapiro 1990 in un loro lavoro nel quale sembrano trovare questo tipo di ef-
fetto suggerivano quale politica scolastica l’assegnazione casuale degli allievi alle va-
rie scuole; b) Se invece gli studenti bravi interagendo con altri studenti bravi guada-
gnano di più in termini di rendimento rispetto a quanto guadagnerebbero gli studenti
meno bravi al loro posto..allora la segregazione farebbe aumentare la qualità media
complessiva delle scuole. La segregazione in questo caso sarebbe giustificata da con-
siderazioni di efficienza.
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a) fare un esercizio “controfattuale”, tipo poter spostare una quota di
studenti delle scuole private nelle scuole pubbliche e misurare la lo-
ro performance nel nuovo contesto;
b) introdurre varabili sulla performance degli studenti relative al perio-
do precedente alla loro iscrizione nelle scuole private e sulle loro ca-
ratteristiche di contesto familiare e sociale, per poter identificare l’ef-
fetto netto dovuto alla qualità scuola; 
c) valutare la qualità relativa degli insegnanti delle scuole private ri-
spetto a quelli delle scuole pubbliche. 
Il primo esercizio non è chiaramente semplice da realizzare. In gene-
rale, però il lavoro di BC non riesce a distinguere tra la minore qualità del-
le scuole privata legata al sorting, quindi alla qualità più scarsa degli stu-
denti che si iscrivono alle scuole private stesse e la più bassa qualità delle
scuole private dovuta alle dotazioni infrastrutturali, agli insegnanti, ai pro-
grammi etc.
Un ulteriore aspetto di cui si dovrebbe tener conto dovrebbe essere quel-
lo relativo all’anno di corso nel quale i nuovi studenti che optano per le scuo-
le private decidono di iscriversi. Un conto è chi si iscrive alla scuola privata
all’ultimo anno del ciclo delle medie (inferiori e/o superiori), con chiare fi-
nalità di recupero, altro è chi si iscrive sin dal primo anno del ciclo.
BC mostrano tra l’altro che la  probabilità di iscrizione nei programmi
di recupero è più alta per gli studenti delle scuole private e interpretano que-
sto dato come segno della minore qualità delle scuole private. Non è tutta-
via immediata la lettura di questo fenomeno. Se, ad esempio, il numero di
studenti respinti in ciascun anno fosse uguale in percentuale per le due ti-
pologie di scuole, il risultato in questione potrebbe voler dire che c’è più mo-
tivazione da parte degli studenti delle scuole private a recuperare e quindi a
impegnarsi per non restare indietro. 
Viceversa BC usano il tasso di promozione (pass-rate) come indice di
qualità. Anche in questo caso sorge il dubbio se sia corretto farlo: una scuo-
la che promuovesse il 100 per cento degli studenti è da ritenersi di qualità
migliore rispetto a un’altra che respinge il 20 o il 30 per cento degli studen-
ti? Forse quali indicatori di qualità sarebbero più utili indici sulle dotazio-
ni; numero di studenti per classe (anche se spesso sono poco significativi nel-
la letteratura empirica).
2. LE POLITICHE DEI BUONI-SCOLASTICI NELLE REGIONI ITALIANE.
La parte forse più stimolante del paper è quella nella quale si ragiona su
come funzionano i sistemi di vouchers adottati in Italia. 
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Nove Regioni italiane hanno introdotto negli scorsi anni forme di sus-
sidi alle famiglie che decidono di iscrivere i propri figli in scuole private.
I vouchers sono concepiti come strumenti per accrescere la possibilità
di scelta da parte delle famiglie tra scuole private e scuole pubbliche
Contributi recenti identificano tre effetti dovuti all’impiego di vouchers
a favore delle scuole private (Hsieh e Urquiola, 2003).
Due effetti agirebbero sulla qualità delle scuole obiettivo del sussidio,
le scuole private:
i) Effetti diretti dovuti alla modifica nella composizione degli studenti:
selezione benefica (sorting). Posto che le scuole private siano di qua-
lità elevata, in virtù dell’abbassamento del costo di iscrizione alle
scuole private si incentiverebbe l’iscrizione da parte degli studenti
meritevoli ma non abbienti;  
ii) Se le scuole private seguono politiche di selezione meritocratiche al
momento dell’iscrizione, l’introduzione di vouchers favorendo forme
di sorting degli studenti più bravi favorirebbe effetti legati all’intera-
zione tra studenti più bravi (peer group effects), con fenomeni di ester-
nalità positive sul rendimento scolastico medio delle scuole private
stesse.
Un terzo effetto agirebbe invece su tutti i tipi di scuola: 
iii)Effetto sulla produttività dovuto alla concorrenza tra scuole pubbli-
che e private: facendo calare il costo di iscrizione alle scuole private,
i vouchers dovrebbero  far aumentare la domanda per questo tipo di
scuole, accrescendo la concorrenza nel sistema scolastico.  Il calo di
iscritti nelle scuole pubbliche dovrebbe far crescere l’impegno dei di-
rettori scolastici  per migliorare l’offerta formativa del loro istituto e
così contrastare la concorrenza delle scuole private. I voucher fareb-
bero aumentare la concorrenza e quindi la qualità dell’istruzione.
Perché ciò sia vero è necessario che le scuole pubbliche subiscano un
calo di entrate percepibile.
Tenuto conto del terzo tipo di meccanismo, un’analisi sulle politiche di
buoni-scolastici come quella di BC, dovrebbe riguardare anche gli effetti che
i vouchers hanno anche sulle scuole pubbliche – via concorrenza. 
Nel lavoro di BC non si analizza cosa accade alla qualità delle scuole
pubbliche quando in un dato distretto sono adottati vouchers, che invece è
una questione assai rilevante in un’indagine di valutazione delle politiche
scolastiche.
Per poter rispondere a questo quesito la ricerca andrebbe fatta a livello
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di scuola e non di provincia, cercando di stabilire gli effetti dell’introduzio-
ne di voucher su tutte le scuole (private e pubbliche) di un dato distretto sco-
lastico.
Vari sono i risultati interessanti che comunque vengono raggiunti dalla
ricerca di BC. 
Dal paper di BC sembrerebbe emergere che l’introduzione di vouchers,
in Italia, ha effetti solo sulle “famiglie al margine”: dato l’ammontare mode-
sto (in percentuale delle rette) della somma che le Regioni italiane  trasferi-
scono, mediante buoni scolastici, a chi vuole frequentare istituti scolastici
privati, solo chi era in partenza marginalmente indeciso sarà influenzato dal
voucher stesso.
Altro aspetto interessante è che pochissime regioni italiane condiziona-
no i voucher al rendimento scolastico, solo la Toscana e e l’Emilia-Romagna.
Quest’ultima in particolare pone come requisito per poter continuare a usu-
fruire dei voucher che lo studente abbia una votazione media del 7. Dise-
gnare il voucher in questo modo potrebbe selezionare gli studenti a favore
di chi davvero vuole scegliere le scuole private per apprendere di più e non
per recuperare anni persi. 
Nella maggior parte dei casi invece l’introduzione di un sussidio alle fa-
miglie che vogliono iscrivere i propri figli a scuole private rischia solo di ac-
crescere il fenomeno di auto-selezione negativa, abbassando la qualità degli
studenti che si iscrivono alle scuole private. 
Ma un risultato di particolare rilievo della ricerca di BC è che in realtà
i voucher non hanno fatto aumentare gli iscritti alla scuola privata ma si so-
no tradotti, in parte, in un aumento del costo delle rette, cioè le scuole si so-
no appropriate di parte dei sussidi regionali facendo crescere le tasse di iscri-
zione e non facendo aumentare il numero degli studenti iscritti. Secondo BC
questo sarebbe stato dovuto a problemi di informazione scarsa da parte del-
le famiglie e agli effetti della crisi economica degli anni presi in considera-
zione.
Questa evidenza tuttavia potrebbe essere interpretata come un segno
della segmentazione del mercato delle scuole private, che possono essere
suddivise secondo varie tipologie: scuole cattoliche, scuole d’élite etc. Cia-
scuna scuola privata sarebbe dotata di un certo potere di mercato, anche
perché la  domanda per questo tipo di scuole è rigida, costituita da fami-
glie ricche che solo marginalmente si farebbe influenzare da un aumento
delle tasse. 
Questo aspetto è cruciale perché, se il mercato è segmentato, l’utilizzo
di vouchers da parte delle autorità di politica economica difficilmente può
accrescere la concorrenza tra le scuole e quindi difficilmente può condurre
a un aumento della qualità media dell’istruzione.
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3. ALCUNE CONCLUSIONI DI POLITICA ECONOMICA.
Il tema è importante. L’idea alla base dei voucher è che tale strumento
possa aumentare la scelta da parte delle famiglie e  possa quindi far miglio-
rare la qualità media delle scuole. 
I canali potrebbero essere due: i) sorting degli studenti, e quindi “segre-
gazione”: bravi da una parte e meno bravi dall’altra, con peer effects virtuo-
si; ii) aumento della concorrenza tra tipi di scuole.
In generale, se i voucher sono introdotti solo per le scuole secondarie
superiori c’è necessariamente una distorsione verso le “scuole di recupero”,
come segnalano nel paper BC, perché si tratta di scuole che forniscono tito-
li spendibili sul mercato del lavoro. Diversa sarebbe una politica mirata an-
che alle scuole pre-secondarie: elementari e medie.
Il risultato importante di BC è che il mercato delle scuole private in Ita-
lia non è un mercato concorrenziale, ma segmentato; questo elemento  ri-
duce molto l’efficacia dei vouchers quale strumento per spostare la doman-
da di istruzione delle famiglie.
L’ammontare del sussidio inoltre è, nell’esperienza italiana, talmente ri-
dotto che non sembra in grado da solo di indurre un cambio nelle scelte del-
le famiglie meno abbienti, ma finisce per influire solo sulla domanda al mar-
gine. Per evitare che siano i proprietari delle scuole a incamerare parte o tut-
to il sussidio l’impiego del vouchers dovrebbe essere consentito prevalente-
mente presso scuole private che  non  abbiano accresciuto le rette scolasti-
co in quel dato anno. 
Per renderli più efficaci i vouchers dovrebbero forse essere condiziona-
ti alla performance degli studenti; evitando però i rischi di collusione tra
scuola e allievi; 
Strumenti, alternativi ai vouchers, per accrescere la qualità dell’istru-
zione possono essere tratti dall’esperienza di alcuni stati americani.
In Pennsylvania e nel New Jersey sono state istituite le chartered school:
le autorità pubbliche hanno concesso particolari finanziamenti a date scuo-
le (e non alle famiglie) localizzate in certi quartieri, condizionandoli alla rea-
lizzazione di dati programmi scolastici (più matematica, più informatica etc)
per compensare lacune riscontrate negli studenti di quei quartieri. Si è cer-
cato di aumentare la qualità dell’istruzione operando sulle aree più deboli e
partendo dall’idea che le famiglie meno agiate non sempre vengono a sape-
re dell’esistenza di buoni scolatici.
Negli Stati Uniti negli anni ’80 ci fu un grande dibattito aperto da un do-
cumento A Nation at Risk dal quale partì un movimento per migliorare la
qualità dell’istruzione: si affermava che la qualità della scuola dipendesse
dalla qualità degli insegnanti e che quindi bisognasse pagare di più i buoni
docenti e smettere di pagare allo stesso modo i docenti lavativi.
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Si proponevano e sono poi stati messi in pratica in vari Stati americani
dei metodi di calcolo di stipendi in base al merito degli insegnanti cosiddet-
ti merit-pay.
Il problema di questo tipo di politica è quello di come si definisce il me-
rito degli insegnanti da premiare.
Un modo è quello di sottoporre gli insegnanti a degli esami di accerta-
mento della loro preparazione. 19 Stati americani ad esempio adottarono a
metà degli anni ottanta un test per la valutazione iniziale degli insegnanti di
nuova assunzione; uno dei problemi che si riscontrava era che gli insegnanti
finivano per studiare per il loro test invece che prepararsi per le lezioni.
Nel Regno Unito nel 1983 sono stati introdotti invece dei moduli di va-
lutazione dei docenti di ruolo; dopo vari esperimenti, dal 1990 è stato in-
trodotto un sistema di valutazione ogni due anni gestito dai docenti stessi e
non semplicemente sulle competenze ma anche sulle tecniche pedagogiche;
simile metodo è stato adottato in tre stati americani: Georgia, Arkansas e Te-
xas: nel caso americano chi superava i test aveva aumenti di stipendio.
In Italia il ministro della pubblica istruzione Luigi Berlinguer propose, an-
ni fa, l’introduzione di un esame per distinguere tra gli insegnanti meritevoli e
quelli no, venne soprannominato “il Quizzone”, e scatenò una forte resistenza
da parte dei sindacati e del corpo docente e quindi non fu mai realizzato.
Un’ipotesi alternativa potrebbe essere quella di introdurre degli esami stan-
dardizzati per tutti gli studenti e di premiare le scuole nelle quali i voti conse-
guiti in tale esame da parte degli studenti sono migliori rispetto a un dato va-
lore soglia. Il difetto di questo tipo di politica è che si possa distorcere la di-
dattica. Gli insegnanti avranno interesse a insegnare ai propri studenti soprat-
tutto come si supera il test piuttosto che a seguire i programmi previsti. 
Una efficace politica di miglioramento della qualità dell’istruzione do-
vrebbe forse basarsi su una combinazione di strumenti: vouchers per aumen-
tare le opportunità di scelta delle famiglie; premi agli insegnanti che si aggior-
nano e si impegnano di più; introduzione di forme standardizzate di accerta-
mento della performance scolastica degli studenti nelle scuole dello stesso tipo
e grado in modo da accrescere la confrontabilità tra una scuola e un’altra.  
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